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Choice of Law, Medical Malpractice, and
Telemedicine: The Present Diagnosis
with a Prescription for the Future
JEFFREY L. RENSBERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the law applied in interstate medical malprac-
tice cases. My purpose is twofold. First, I synthesize the hundreds of
cases in this area of law to understand the decisions the courts are mak-
ing. The subject of malpractice is in itself an important topic in the field
of choice of law because state policies regarding medical malpractice
differ significantly and interstate medical care is common due to
patients' needs for care by remote specialists. These two factors, differ-
ing state laws and interstate transactions, are the ingredients of a conflict
of laws problem. Moreover, the general current toward greater mobility
can be expected to increase the number of malpractice conflicts issues in
the future. After reading the cases, somewhat to my surprise, I discov-
ered what Albert Ehrenzweig would have called "true rules."' That is,
regardless of the choice of law methodology used, the results of the
cases show a fair amount of uniformity.
Second, I lay out a framework for analyzing a particular type of
interstate malpractice case that we can expect to see more of in the near
future. In recent years, communications technology, and specifically the
Internet, has enabled physicians to begin diagnosing and treating
patients from a distance without ever actually seeing them. This new
technology, called telemedicine, increases the potential for claims of
interstate malpractice by decreasing the expense of obtaining treatment
from an out-of-state specialist. Instead of getting on a plane and flying
to the Mayo Clinic, patients can go online and secure the same services.
Telemedicine is one aspect of the broader issues raised by interstate reg-
ulation of professional activities on the Internet. What we discover in
this context will also be of use to the interstate practice of law and other
professions.
Telemedicine will become more common because it multiplies the
power of health professionals to heal patients by distributing their
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.
I. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True
Rules," 49 CAL. L. REV. 240 (1961) (positing that courts reach predictable choice of law results
despite methodological differences).
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knowledge and skill over a wider area, at a much lower cost than is
possible in a traditional practice.2 By use of technologies ranging from
telephones and fax machines to electronic transmissions of data from
echocardiograms, telemedicine increases the ability of health profession-
als to cause effects in remote locations. But effects can be either good
or bad. Thus, telemedicine also expands opportunities for malpractice to
occur.
Telemedicine's ability to produce expanded effects is no different
from that of earlier technologies that made communication less expen-
sive. In the future, the new information technologies will probably not
be seen as a sharp break from the past but rather as the next step in a
process of expanding communications that began over a century ago
with the telegraph and continued with the telephone and radio. What
appears today to be revolutionary3 will probably appear evolutionary4 to
our descendants.
Viewing telemedicine as the latest stage of an evolutionary process
affects the analysis of the legal issues it raises. We do not need to invent
new legal constructs for telemedicine. Instead, recognition of
telemedicine's technological antecedents allows for a relatively
smoother adoption of legal standards by analogizing to the law that has
developed for those antecedents. And there is no lack of analogies. The
telephone, for example, has widespread use in medical consultation.5
The telephone, like telemedicine, is a technology that allows widespread
dissemination of an expert's knowledge and skill at a relatively low cost.
Precedents involving the use of the telephone in the practice of medicine
provide a guide in understanding the issues raised by telemedicine.
Choice of law has been influenced over the last century by new
methods of transacting business and inflicting injury. Automobile
2. A great deal of information about telemedicine can be found on the web. See, e.g.,
American Telemedicine Association, at http://www.atmeda.org (last visited Aug. 31, 2000); E-
health & Telemedecine, Arent Fox Attorneys at Law, at http://www.arentfox.com/quickGuide/
businessLines/e-health/e-healthtelemed/-e-healthtelemed.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2000);
Telemedicine Information Exchange, at http://tie.telemed.org (last visited Aug. 31, 2000).
3. See Ira Magaziner, At the Crossroads of Law and Technology, 33 Lov. L.A. L. Rv.
1165, 1181 (2000) ("I believe that the challenge our legal system faces is this: Are we going to try
to force the great creativity of this new Internet economy into old legal models, or are we going to
realize that we have to adapt those models and transform them to enable this revolution to
continue to flourish?").
4. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the
Promise, 49 DuKE L.J. 147, 160 n.132 (1999) ("I believe that lawyer activity on the Internet can
be analyzed under traditional legal principles, just as any of the other activities in which lawyers
regularly engage, and I reject the notion that an entirely new body of 'cyberlaw' must be created
to cope with the innovations sparked by the 'Computer Revolution.'").
5. Stacey Swatek Huie, Comment, Facilitating Telemedicine: Reconciling National Access
with State Licensing Laws, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 377, 379-80 (1996).
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cases, 6 cases involving contracts formed over the telephone or otherwise
at a distance,' and workers' compensation cases involving multi-state
employment8 are all artifacts of twentieth-century business and social
practices which are made possible by technological innovations. During
roughly the same period of time, there was a tumult in choice of law that
many called revolutionary.9 But the changes in choice of law were not
in response to new methods of transacting business. The revolution
often was staged on facts that were technologically feasible in the nine-
teenth century.' 0 Rather, the changes in choice of law were the result of
revolutions in theory, a shift in the way in which law was viewed."
Moreover, after the revolution, much of the old choice of law regime
remained.' 2 Thus, while choice of law has gone through significant
changes this last century and technology has simultaneously advanced,
one cannot convincingly join these two developments in a causal mar-
riage. The courts sometimes have applied old methods to new problems
and at other times have applied new methods to old problems. It is
therefore useful to look at previous experience to construct a model for
choice of law and telemedicine.
Before looking at the current caselaw on interstate malpractice, I
will first lay out a bit of choice of law theory in order to provide a
context for what I have observed in the cases. This brief excursus, in
Part II, need not detain those at ease with choice of law issues. I have
attempted to clarify and simplify the array of choice of law approaches
by identifying the basic choices about choice of law policy that shape
the specific systems used by courts. Part III reviews the caselaw on
interstate medical malpractice to establish how the courts have analyzed
choice of law in such cases. Finally, Part IV discusses how current
caselaw trends might apply to the unique problems of telemedicine.
II. CHOICE OF LAW THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF MALPRACTICE
Telemedicine seems to hold great promise for delivering advanced
6. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (dealing with a guest statute).
7. E.g., Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 139 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1958) (deciding a case in
which a contract was created over the telephone).
8. E.g., Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
9. Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772,
775-76 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99
(N.Y. 1954).
11. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 35 (2d ed. 1995) (noting the effect of the legal
realist school on the development of choice of law).
12. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972) (setting out three choice
of law guidelines, two of which apply the traditional lex loci delecti test).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
medical care to people previously without access to such care. But
telemedicine's distribution of medical care across state lines raises diffi-
cult issues involving interstate regulation. State tort law and licensing
are two ways that states achieve regulation.
By imposing financial costs on substandard medical care, state tort
law creates an incentive toward quality care. In addition to regulating
the quality of medical care, the tort system also regulates the distribution
of the cost of medical care. Part of this cost is the loss created by-to
use a neutral term-unfortunate outcomes. The cost of these unfortu-
nate outcomes is sometimes passed on from the patient to the health
professional, from the health professional to his or her insurer, through
the insurer to other health professionals, and from those health profes-
sionals to their patients. The tort system thus operates as a rather round-
about insurance system for the risk of injury from medical care.
Depending on where the floor of liability is set, states insure either all
risks of medical care (strict liability) or only those risks arising from
especially poor care (a negligence system). 3 This process of distribut-
ing costs also relates closely to the tort system's goal of providing com-
pensation for those injured. This function of the tort law is distinct from
the first two because it is directed at the patient-plaintiff rather than the
physician-defendant.
These three functions of the malpractice tort system-regulating
the conduct of medical providers, distributing the costs of the medical
enterprise among all participants in it, and providing compensation for
those injured by the medical care industry-are valued differently in
different states. Moreover, even states which agree that a particular goal
is the most important one may disagree about how to achieve it. A state
that focuses on distributing costs or compensation may impose a higher
standard of liability, perhaps approaching strict liability, because identi-
fying and deterring substandard conduct is not really its concern. Alter-
natively, a state may have a high concern for distributing costs but
believe that high liability over-deters medical professionals from provid-
ing care; accordingly, the state may enact caps on damages. In short,
state tort law differs because states' laws express differing values and
differing means to achieve shared values. It is because of these differ-
ences that choice of law problems exist.
In creating tort law, states are motivated by some subset of all pos-
sible tort cases. Presumably, a state is not motivated by damages
13. While our system nominally awards damages only for negligent medical care, the actual
awarding of damages is less than perfectly precise as it is administered by lay juries, trial court
judges, and appellate courts. As a result, some damage caused by substandard care goes
uncompensated and some adequate care is negatively sanctioned by damages.
[Vol. 55:31
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awarded in the courts of other states where no plaintiff, defendant, or
conduct local to the enacting states is involved. In'stead, a state is con-
cerned with those cases having a more direct bearing on it. It is of
course possible that more than one state would like to regulate a particu-
lar episode of medical care. One of the goals of choice of law is to sort
out such competing claims to authority over events or transactions.
14
When a transaction or event touches two or more states in a way that
plausibly draws into play their differing laws, choice of law decides
which law to apply. It is possible that one state's claim is plausible but
no more than that; upon examination, that state does not in fact desire to
have its law apply. Perhaps more frequently, two or more states do
desire to have their law applied to the litigation. A choice of law system
must then devise a way to rank these conflicting claims to authority.
Moreover, a properly-functioning choice of law system will have the
added virtue of enabling medical providers to predict which legal system
will govern a situation. Certainty, predictability, and upholding parties'
expectations are themselves major goals in choice of law.15
The problem for choice of law in medical malpractice, and in
telemedicine in particular, is to determine which state should be allowed
to perform the regulatory and compensatory functions outlined above
while simultaneously upholding the parties' expectations. The lack of
an answer to this choice of law question introduces a great deal of uncer-
tainty into the telemedicine health care delivery system. This uncer-
tainty discourages investment in telemedicine. This disincentive,
moreover, is not limited to those providing substandard care-for exam-
ple, certain on-line Viagra vendors-a category of care givers we should
like to discourage. Instead, this disincentive discourages all potential
providers of telemedicine-an outcome that we should not desire. It is
therefore important to establish a set of rules about interstate regulation
that will provide greater certainty and thus facilitate the expansion of
medical care to those previously under-served.
Beginning students of choice of law are often confused and demor-
alized by the variety of approaches to the choice of law problem. 6
Some states, perhaps a dozen or so, still use the traditional approach of
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFIicT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b)-(c) (1971) (listing relevant
factors in determining the applicable rule of law as including "the relevant policies of the forum"
and "the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
15. Id. at § 6(2)(f) (stating that one relevant factor in determining the applicable rule of law is
"certainty, predictability and uniformity of result").
16. Demoralization is not limited to neophytes in choice of law. See Louise Weinberg,
Methodological Interventions and the Slavery Cases; or, Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56
MD. L. REV. 1316, 1322 (1997) (pondering the role of choice of law in slavery cases, "I found
myself, quite stunned, asking the heretical and in fact nihilistic question whether having a special
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the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws. 7 A plurality of states have
adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 8
Handfuls of states have adopted governmental interest analysis, the bet-
ter law approach, or some other choice of law exotic.' 9 Moreover, many
states have a mongrel choice of law system, borrowing from two or
more choice of law models.2" In the face of this variegation, describing
of how states will resolve choice of law issues in telemedicine seems
impossible. But the different approaches to choice of law can be organ-
ized around a few basic principles.
A. Basic Choice of Law Choices
The variety of approaches to choice of law can be simplified by
viewing them as products of a series of choices driving the subsequent
development of particular choice of law systems. Rather than separately
explaining the First Restatement, the Second Restatement, interest analy-
sis, and other approaches, I will identify these approaches as I proceed
through the basic choices of choice of law, thereby demonstrating how
they arise from different soils.
It is important to bear in mind the two levels on which choice of
law operates. As a preliminary matter, choice of law must be able to
weed out those states with no legitimate claim to govern a matter. The
Due Process 2 and Full Faith and Credit22 Clauses sometimes preclude a
state from applying its own law.23 The approaches described below
offer advice on the content of those constitutional norms. The second
level of choice of law assumes that two states' laws could be applied
under the Constitution and then answers the prescriptive question of
which law should apply.
1. THE PUBLIC APPROACH
The first question of orientation in choice of law is whether to focus
body of law for the conflict of laws has not been a mistake. Perhaps we should abandon the
enterprise. The whole enterprise.").
17. Seven states still use the First Restatement approach in full. Additionally, three use it in
contract cases but not in tort cases. Another four use it in tort cases but not contract cases.
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998: Twelfth Annual Survey,
47 Am. J. CoMp. L. 327, 331-36 (1999).
18. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth Annual
Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447, 459, 460 (1997).
19. Id.
20. Symeonides, supra note 17, at 331-36.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
23. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
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on the states or the parties involved in the dispute. The two dominant
choice of law approaches of the twentieth century concern themselves
primarily with the states.24 I identify such an orientation as a public
approach.
What do I mean by a choice of law approach that focuses on the
state? The public orientation derives from the way one frames the
choice of law question. One way to view choice of law is as an attempt
to solve, or at least moderate, states' conflicting claims to legal authority
over a given dispute or transaction. Legal authority over a dispute
means, in this context, authority to decide what outcome should result
from a given set of facts, or, as it is sometimes called, legislative juris-
diction." If one views the choice of law enterprise as an exercise in
determining proper legislative jurisdiction, then one is drawn to a public
orientation. One is looking for a connection between the state and the
litigation that allows the state to claim legitimate governance of it.
Choice of law under a public approach is all about such connec-
tions or, as the jargon would have it, "contacts" between the subject
matter of the litigation and the state. These connections give the state
(in a analysis very similar to that performed for judicial jurisdiction26 )
its claim to governance. Once one decides that the task is to find con-
nections that legitimate and prioritize state governance, the next question
is what kind of connection properly counts. Historically, two types of
connections have been used in choice of law to establish a state's author-
ity to govern: territorial connections and domiciliary connections. These
two categories create the major divergence in the public approaches to
choice of law.
Which set of connections one chooses depends upon some basic
assumptions about the nature of the law. A public approach to choice of
law tries to determine whether a state has a legitimate claim to govern a
dispute. The public approach therefore demands an answer to the funda-
mental jurisprudential question of what gives a state the authority to
govern at all. Without going too far into an admittedly deep subject, I
will explore how choice of law has answered that question.
24. Despite the nominal commitment to a public approach focusing on the states, one suspects
that courts administering the rules of choice of law sometimes bent the rules to accommodate their
concern about private parties. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961) (declining
to assert state interest under interest analysis approach in order to allow recovery in contract);
Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (failing to apply normal First Restatement rule to
allow plaintiff to recover in tort).
25. Such lawmaking authority might or might not coincide with judicial authority-the power
to adjudicate a particular case (i.e., judicial jurisdiction).
26. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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a. The Territorial Conception
If Alice and Bob both live in Texas and have a car accident there,
undoubtedly Texas, and Texas alone, can legitimately claim governance
of the disputes arising from the accident. This seems obvious, but why?
One answer is that Texas law applies because the car accident occurred
in Texas. Under this view, a state's laws can and should govern a dis-
pute when the event giving rise to it occurred in that state. This view of
the law and the choice of law implications flowing from it is called
territorialism, a term used somewhat pejoratively today.
This is the approach of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws,27
which provided the dominant view for roughly the first half of the twen-
tieth century. The First Restatement gives the place where the underly-
ing events occurred the power to govern in order to protect "vested
rights." Under this theory, when a tort occurs or a contract is made, the
parties' rights become "vested" and are thereafter unalterable. Another
state applying Texas law to the hypothetical simply enforces the rights
that arose (and became fixed) in Texas. The language of vested rights
might suggest that the First Restatement is concerned with the private
interests or "rights" of the actors and thus should be classified under the
private factors approach to choice of law. However, the right identified
by the First Restatement is merely the product of its territorial commit-
ment. Vested rights flow from a territorial understanding that a state can
legitimately govern only events occurring within it. In the words of
Joseph Beale, "[s]ince the power of a state is supreme within its own
territory, no other state can exercise power there."28
The rules characteristic of the First Restatement determine applica-
ble law by looking to where a single key event occurred. In tort cases,
the First Restatement looks to the place of the wrong, 9 which is defined
as the place where the injury to the plaintiff occurred. The place of
injury governs because injury is the last event in a tort chronology; until
injury, no tort occurs, no matter how foul the negligence.30 At the time
of injury, the plaintiff will be in a particular state. That state alone can
legitimately govern the rights of the parties because the tort sprang into
existence within that sovereign's boundaries.
This identification of a single key event allows the territorial
approach to achieve or at least to offer the hope of uniformity of out-
come. Because the choice of law turns on the location of a single event,
27. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(FIRST)].
28. 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 61.1 (1935).
29. RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 27, at § 377.
30. E.g., Ala. & Great S. Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
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there will be no hard cases where important contacts are spread out
among several states. In this sense, territorial choice of law is constitu-
tional law as well. The system in each case ordains only one state to
provide governing law.3' Choice of law under this approach does not
need a scheme for sorting out conflicting legitimate claims to authority
because only one claim-the claim of the state where the key event
occurred-has legitimacy. Were it otherwise, the infrequent but recur-
ring cases of tortious conduct in one state causing injury in another32
would create great difficulty for the place of the wrong rule. In such
cases, does the rule look to the place where the negligence occurred or
the place where the injury occurred? The territorial view opts for the
latter with such authoritarianism that any other choice is not simply
unwise, but quite illegal.
b. The Domiciliary or Personal Conception and Interest Analysis
I earlier asked why we all agree that if Alice and Bob both live in
Texas and have a car accident there, Texas could legitimately apply its
law to claims arising from the accident. The territorialist would answer,
as discussed above, that only Texas can create liabilities for events
occurring within its borders. A quite different answer is that Texas
properly legislates to protect its domiciliaries and that because the par-
ties to the case are from Texas, Texas law should apply. This is the
personal conception of legislative jurisdiction, which bases its choice of
law outcomes on where people live. This theory may also be referred to
as the domiciliary conception of choice of law. The theory reasons that
states have the prerogative of assigning liabilities to their citizens wher-
ever the citizens go because states' laws are directed at benefiting and
regulating people. Laws are admittedly addressed toward things and
human conduct (such as injuries, agreements, and property); however, it
is the people, not the things or conduct, in which the state is interested
and which give the state a reason to want to legislate at all. Therefore, a
law should follow the person as he or she moves through space, rather
than attach itself only to local things.
This approach falls under the broader heading of interest analysis.
Interest analysis is based directly on a public orientation. Its fundamen-
tal question is whether a state has an "interest" in applying its law. This
question is frequently answered by ascertaining the parties' domiciliary
connections. However, interest analysis, at least in its later forms, will
31. E.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1918) (holding that only the
place of making of contract may invalidate it).
32. E.g., Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1993); Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985); Carroll, 11 So. at 803.
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also examine the place where events occurred when the location might
plausibly lead to a state having an interest. A tort cause of action for
battery, for example, might logically be designed to control behavior
within the state. Therefore, when Alice, a Texan, commits a battery
against Bob, a Texan, in Oklahoma, Oklahoma has an interest despite
the lack of a domiciliary connection. Under such an approach, state
laws are classified according to whether they are designed to protect or
regulate the person or whether they are designed to regulate conduct.
The existence of a state interest then turns on the purpose of the state
law and whether the local connection is of the right type to invoke the
state interest.
Interest analysis and the personal approach provide a tidy solution
to cases where the parties are both from the same state but are less deci-
sive when the parties have a split domicile. Suppose that Alice and Bob,
both Texans, have a car accident in Oklahoma. The territorial approach
would place governance in Oklahoma as the place where the rights
between the parties arose. The personal approach would normally33
place governance in Texas, because only Texas is legitimately con-
cerned with Texas domiciliaries. However, if the parties are from differ-
ent states the personal approach sputters. If Bob is from Oklahoma and
each party is favored by his or her own state's law, Oklahoma and Texas
would both have a legitimate claim to govern the dispute arising from
the accident.34 Conversely, if each party is benefited by the law of his or
her opponent's state, neither state would appear to have an interest in
having its law applied to the benefit of a foreign party. These problems,
known respectively as true conflicts and unprovided-for cases, are iden-
tified, but not solved, by a personal approach to choice of law. In addi-
tion, even in cases of common domicile, another state may have non-
domiciliary interests based on conduct regulation. The interest analysis
or personal approach to choice of law unlike the territorial approach fails
to identify a single connector which determines whether a state may
legitimately apply its own law. Because both parties' domiciles are rele-
vant, the personal approach needs some sort of tiebreaker. 35 This is the
second level of choice of law referred to above. At this point, two states
laws could apply and it must be determined which law should apply.
33. This conclusion is subject to the presence of conduct-regulating rules in Oklahoma, which
might give that state an interest.
34. The exact nature of the interest in each state would of course depend on the content of
each state's law.
35. One way of breaking the tie is simply to resort to forum law. This was the suggestion in
the early writings of interest analysis. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 107, 184 (1963). One suspects that states still have a latent preference for
forum law. See Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
GA. L. REv. 49, 87-88 (1989).
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The debate between the territorial and personal conceptions has run
for centuries and continues to run.36 It is not my purpose to resolve it;
the foregoing discussion instead makes a more simple and fundamental
point. Although the territorial and personal approaches to choice of law
appear to be in conflict, they have a common link: both begin and end as
an explanation of why states have laws and to what kinds of cases those
laws may reasonably apply. They answer the question differently but
share a common framing of the issue. The issue for each approach is to
delineate the proper extent of a state's powers. For that reason, both
approaches may be put under the heading of public approaches to choice
of law.
2. THE PRIVATE APPROACH
An entirely different orientation towards choice of law looks to the
parties, not the state, as the chief concern. These approaches are focused
on the second level of choice of law; they assume that two or more states
might properly apply their law and tackle the hard question of which law
should apply. These approaches share a common orientation that distin-
guishes them from the public approach because they examine the choice
of law problem from the standpoint of fairness to, and justice for, the
parties rather than the standpoint of the states. These party-oriented
approaches are often used to supplement the interest analysis approach,
breaking ties created by domiciliary analysis.
There are several private approaches. Some courts apply the "bet-
ter law."37 This approach begins with the observation that a choice of
law case is just that-a choice for the court to make between two com-
peting legal rules. This view holds that the best approach to such a
problem is to act as common law judges historically have acted and to
choose the law that makes most sense. 38 Another choice of law
approach focuses on the fairness to parties in the context of a multistate
case rather than on the substantive rights of the parties. The concern is
to choose the law that upholds, or at least does not upset, the parties'
expectations.39 Under this approach, there is a tendency to revert toward
36. Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REv. 893, 902 (1988);
Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL.
L. REv. 1309, 1319-20 (1999).
37. Symeonides, supra note 18, at 459 (listing Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin with respect to tort conflicts).
38. Ralph U. Whitten, Improving the "Better Law" System: Some Impudent Suggestions for
Reordering and Reformulating Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations, 52 ARK. L. REv. 177,
227 (1999).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, at 6(2)(f) (1971) (stating that one choice of law
policy is "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result").
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territorial solutions4" because they often reflect the parties' presumed
expectations. The search for "conflicts justice" is related to this "multis-
tate fairness approach."4 1 The focus of each of these theories is on the
parties rather than the state.
III. CHOICE OF LAW PRACTICE: THE LAW APPLIED TO INTERSTATE
MEDICAL PRACTICE
With the basic choices laid out, I now examine how states have
used them in the medical malpractice context. The following survey of
interstate medical malpractice cases shows how courts have dealt with
existing interstate medical practices. This is useful in and of itself and
also as an indicator of how courts might deal with legal issues arising
from telemedicine.
I have located eighty-five42 case decisions involving tort claims
against health providers that discuss or apply choice of law. A summary
of these cases shows that the courts have reached fairly consistent out-
comes in interstate malpractice cases. I will approach this body of case
law from two perspectives.
First, I will analyze groups of cases concerning issues that one may
expect to occur with some frequency in malpractice cases. Some issues,
such as the law applicable in determining whether a release given to one
defendant releases all,43 are important in general but do not raise special
concerns for malpractice cases. I have not analyzed cases presenting
such issues in detail. On the other hand, I have analyzed in detail cases
addressing issues such as the law applicable in determining whether a
plaintiffs claim must be submitted to an arbitration or screening panel
because of these cases' obvious importance to interstate health profes-
sionals.' Finally, issues such as the applicable statute of limitations do
not on their face seem to have special relevance to health care providers,
40. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972) (reverting to the
place of conduct and injury); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856-57 (Pa. 1970) (applying the
law of the place of conduct).
41. Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 983 (1994).
42. Several of the cases contain distinct pronouncements on more than one choice of law
issue. I also have included a few cases whose statements on choice of law are probably best
classified as dicta because they reinforce a point made in other cases. The cases I have analyzed
have been culled from hundreds I have read to determine whether they contain any useful holdings
on choice of law.
43. See, e.g., Lamphier v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 524 A.2d 729 (D.C. 1987); Daily v. Somberg,
146 A.2d 676 (N.J. 1958).
44. See infra notes 77-164 and accompanying text.
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but because of the volume of such cases I have included them in the
analysis .
After this issue-specific case analysis, I will summarize the results
of all the cases to determine whether any general choice of law patterns
emerge. Regardless of the particular issue some basic questions emerge.
Are courts deferential to the plaintiff's home state law? Are they defer-
ential to the defendant's? Do they favor forum law so that the real battle
is over jurisdiction? This analysis provides an overview of how courts,
in the aggregate, are treating such cases.46
A. Analysis by Issue
1. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The applicable statute of limitations is one of the more frequently-
litigated choice of law issues in medical malpractice cases. Of the
approximately eighty cases collected that address the law applicable to
malpractice actions, fifteen concern a statute of limitations issue.
At one time, most states applied a simple rule regarding the appli-
cable statute of limitations. Limitations were classified as procedural
and thus were applied along with other procedural law of the forum.4 7
An exception to this rule existed for some statutory causes of action
having a limitations period specifically applicable to them. These limi-
tations periods were characterized as limiting not merely the remedy, but
also the right sued upon; they were therefore applied as part of the sub-
stantive law.48
The traditional approach is criticized on several grounds.49 First,
the decisive effect that a statute of limitations has on a case indicates
that limitations should be classified as substantive, not procedural. Sec-
ond, the procedural classification leads to forum shopping: a plaintiff
whose claim is barred under the law of the state that would substantively
govern need only find a state that has jurisdiction over the defendant and
a longer statute of limitations. Doing so turns losing case into a poten-
45. See infra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
46. Others in choice of law have employed an empirical approach to the body of caselaw.
These other works do not concentrate on a particular subject matter. See, e.g. Patrick J. Borchers,
The Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1992);
Solimine, supra note 35.
47. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 27, at §§ 603, 604. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the Kansas court's application
of its own statue of limitations).
48. See, e.g., Bournias v. Atl. Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
49. For a general discussion of the traditional approach to statutes of limitations and criticism
of it, see Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 324-26 (1990) and
Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic And International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 559
(1989).
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tial winner.5" Third, the distinction between a statute of limitations that
bars the remedy and one that bars the right is abstract and unconnected
to any sensible choice of law or limitations policy.
These criticisms have lead to several measures of reform. In an
attempt to curtail forum shopping, legislatures have enacted borrowing
statutes. These statutes provide that when a cause of action would be
barred under the limitations law of the state where the cause of action
arose, the shorter limitations period of that state will be incorporated into
the forum law to bar the claim.5" Additionally, some courts have simply
changed the characterization of statutes of limitations from procedural to
substantive. Under this approach, a court determines the substantive law
that is to govern other issues in the case by using its normal choice of
law process and then applies the statute of limitations of that state as part
of the substantive law.52 A variation on this approach is to treat the
statute of limitations as substantive by applying a separate choice of law
analysis on the statute of limitations under whatever choice of law
approach the court uses.5 3
One finds examples of each of these approaches in the mal-
practice cases. The traditional procedural characterization is some-
times used, particularly in older cases, 54  but also in more recent
50. For a wonderful example of the forum shopping possibilities raised by the traditional rule,
see Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
51. For examples of cases involving borrowing statutes in interstate malpractice cases, see
Dahlberg v. Harris, 916 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1990); Weethee v. Holzer Clinic, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 19
(W. Va. 1997); Conway v. Ogier, 184 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). The chief issue in
borrowing statute cases is whether foreign rules that implement the borrowed foreign statute of
limitations will also be applied. See Dahlberg, 916 F.2d at 446 (holding that although the forum
will borrow a sister-state statue of limitations, forum commencement provisions apply); Weethee,
490 S.E.2d at 23 (remanding to determine whether to apply forum savings statute when statute of
limitations is borrowed); Conway, 184 N.E.2d at 683-84 (holding that forum law applies to
determine whether an otherwise time-barred counterclaim may be pleaded as recoupment).
52. See UNIF. CONFLICT oF LAWS - LIMrrATION ACT § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 158 (1999) ("This
section treats limitation periods as substantive, to be governed by the limitations law of a state
whose law governs other substantive issues inherent in the claim").
53. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 418 (N.J. 1973).
54. See Cuthbertson v. Uhley, 509 F.2d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying forum law, under
which cause of action accrues upon termination of treatment, as opposed to foreign law that tolls
accrual until discovery of the injury); Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1959)
(applying the forum's shorter statute of limitations as procedural although the action would have
been timely under the law of the state where the alleged malpractice occurred); Gattis v. Chavez,
413 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. S.C. 1976) (applying forum statute of limitations to alleged malpractice
occurring in another state even though all parties lived in that other state at the time of the
malpractice); Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (applying forum's
shorter statute of limitations to malpractice alleged to have occurred in another state under whose
law the action would have been timely). See also Conway, 184 N.E.2d at 683-84 (defendant pled
malpractice as a counterclaim to a physician's claim for nonpayment for services. Although a
malpractice claim would have been barred under the law of the state where the malpractice
occurred, the court characterized a forum rule that statutes of limitation are not a defense to a
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ones." Significantly, in about half of the cases applying the traditional
rule that the statute of limitations is determined by forum procedural
law, the forum was applying a shorter statute of limitations than existed
in the other state. 56 This result is the same one reached under the mod-
em approach which looks at the policy behind the statute of limita-
tions.57 A state has a legitimate procedural interest in protecting its
courts from stale claims, regardless of whether or not the state has any
other connection to the case. This procedural interest is served by
applying a shorter statute of limitations. Applying a forum's shorter
statute of limitations also raises no concerns of forum shopping by the
plaintiff.
Interestingly, two of the cases 58 present what I call a "reverse"
forum shopping problem: the defendant commits malpractice and then
moves to a state with a shorter statute of limitations. Applying the pro-
cedural classification results in the plaintiff losing a claim because of the
defendant's voluntary relocation.59 Although characterizing the statute
of limitations issue as procedural is not problematic when the forum has
a shorter statute of limitations, these cases demonstrate the potential
claim for recoupment as procedural and would have allowed the claim in the form of
recoupment.).
55. See Cox v. Kaufman, 571 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (applying forum state's
statute of limitations as procedural law). One might also include Huang v. D'Albora, 644 A.2d 1
(D.C. 1994). In that case, the court acknowledged the exception to the traditional rule-a foreign
statute of limitations where the limitations is part of the cause of action itself is substantive; the
court held, however, that the rule in question concerning the tolling of the foreign statute of
limitations was procedural and thus applied forum law that did not allow for tolling. Id. at 4.
Cases involving borrowing statutes involve similar analyses. When a foreign statute of limitations
is invoked under a borrowing statute, courts must also address whether related rules, such as
tolling of the claim, are also invoked. Courts often, although not invariably, address this as a
problem to be solved by determining whether the statute of limitations-related rule is procedural.
See supra note 51.
56. See Cuthbertson, 509 F.2d at 226 (applying forum statute of limitations which began to
run from termination of treatment in preference to foreign statue of limitations which began to run
from the discovery of the cause of action although both statute of limitations were two years);
Keaton, 326 F. Supp. at 1158 (applying forum statute of limitations even if action would not be
barred in state where cause of action arose). Kozan, 270 F.2d at 841-42 (applying forum statute of
limitations barring a tort action after one year in favor of the foreign statute of limitations barring
the action after two years). Cf. Gattis, 413 F. Supp. at 35, 40 (applying the forum's statute of
limitations, yet finding that the statute did not bar the claim, the court did not state whether the
claim would have been barred under the law of the other state). See also Huang, 644 A.2d at 4
(applying a no-tolling rule of the forum as procedural, resulting in the claim being time-barred).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, at § 142(1) ("[a]n action will not be
maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum").
58. Keaton, 326 F. Supp. at 1157-58; Kozan, 270 F.2d at 841-42.
59. If the forum's statute of limitations is long enough to allow the claim or forum law
otherwise allows the claim, the plaintiff suffers no prejudice by the defendant's move. For an
example, see Gattis, 413 F. Supp. at 35.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
unfairness to the plaintiff of applying a forum's shorter statute of limita-
tions after a defendant's relocation.
More recent cases usually take a substantive approach to statute of
limitations. For example in Merkle v. Robinson,6" the physician had
treated the plaintiff in West Virginia at a time when both he and the
patient lived in that state; after the defendant retired to Florida, the
Plaintiff sued him there.6 The action was timely in West Virginia but
not in Florida.62 The court, applying the "most significant relationship"
test of the Second Restatement, concluded that West Virginia law should
apply so as to allow the claim because all contacts with the case were in
West Virginia, with the lone exception of the defendant's later-acquired
domicile.63
What is notable about Merkle is that the Florida court applied a
longer foreign statute of limitations. Thus, the court was willing to
subordinate its own procedural interest in avoiding adjudication of stale
claims64 in the interest of upholding the substantive policies of another
state. The court's conclusion avoids the problem of reverse forum shop-
ping incident to a defendant's relocation. In fact, this likely influenced
the court: the court noted that the plaintiff originally had filed suit in
West Virginia, but that the action had been dismissed because the state's
long-arm statute did not reach the defendant.65 More broadly, the result
in Merkle liberates statute of limitations outcomes from the vagaries of
jurisdiction. Under the procedural approach, a plaintiff hoped to find a
state with both jurisdiction and a long enough statute of limitations.
Conversely, a defendant hoped that he or she would not be subject to the
jurisdiction of a state that was unrelated to the cause of action, but hap-
pened to have a longer statute of limitations than the state in which the
malpractice occurred.
None of the remaining cases using the substantive approach result
in the application of a longer foreign statute of limitations.66 One of
them applied a foreign statute of limitations, but it was shorter than that
60. 737 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1999).
61. Id. at 541.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 542, 543.
64. The court discounted this concern by asserting that few such claims would come to
Florida courts. Id. at 543.
65. Id. at 541 n.2.
66. One other possible case of a court applying a longer foreign statute of limitations is
Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1985). In that case, brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C. § 1346 against the United States, the treatment had occurred in
New York at a time when the plaintiff resided in that state; however, the plaintiff had
subsequently moved to California. Id. at 1437. The court concluded that the "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contacts" test dictated the application of New York limitations law and that under
that law the action was timely. Id. at 1437-38, 1439. But the opinion does not state whether the
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of the forum.67 Three other cases (two of which were decided under
New Jersey choice of law rules) applied the forum's longer statute of
limitations.68 These cases are distinguishable from the earlier cases
applying the forum's longer statute of limitations as procedural because
there were significant connections to the forum in these cases. Although
in two of the cases the treatment of the patient occurred in a state other
than the forum, in both of these cases the plaintiff resided in the forum at
the time of the alleged malpractice and the defendant was licensed in the
forum as well as in the state of treatment.69 In the third case applying a
longer forum statute of limitations, the forum was the place of treatment,
the plaintiffs residence shortly after the alleged negligence, and the
place where the relationship between the parties was centered. 70 Thus,
in all of the cases applying a forum's longer statute of limitations under
a substantive approach, the forum had connections that gave it an inter-
est, both in compensating the plaintiff and in deterring the defendant by
virtue of his local license.7' The existence of such factors removes the
specter of an unrelated forum applying its own statute of limitations
thereby unfairly extending the time in which to sue.
One also may make some general observations about the cases as a
group. In eleven of the fifteen cases, the forum statute of limitations
was applied, compared to only four applications of the foreign statute of
limitations. The sample includes some older cases applying the rule that
limitations is a matter of procedure governed by forum law. One might
think that the older cases cause an undue emphasis on forum law in this
sample. But the procedural characterization in fact retains vitality. Not
all of the cases employing the procedural characterization are old.72
Moreover, a number of the borrowing statute cases use a procedural
characterization to employ a forum rule, such as tolling, that relates to
and implements a borrowed foreign statute of limitations. 73 A total of
eight of the fifteen cases thus involve the procedural characterization in
some form. Additionally, the cases using a substantive approach tend to
action would have been timely under California law. For this reason, one cannot say whether the
court allowed the use of a longer foreign statute of limitations.
67. See Bonerb v. Richard J. Caron Found., 159 F.R.D. 16 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying
shorter statute of limitations of the place of injury and domicile of defendant, but action not time-
barred because of the relation back to a previously filed complaint).
68. See Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978); Dasha v. Adelman, 699 N.E.2d 20
(Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 715 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. 1998).
69. See Schum, 578 F.2d at 496-97; Safer, 715 A.2d at 364.
70. See Dasha, 699 N.E.2d at 24.
71. See Schum, 578 F.2d at 496; Dasha, 699 N.E.2d at 26; Safer, 715 A.2d at 364.
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. For this reason, I have included these cases in
the count of cases applying forum law, although it should be noted that they also apply a foreign
statute of limitations.
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apply the statute of limitations of the place of treatment. Of the six
cases using the substantive approach, four apply the law of the place of
treatment.74 Only two apply the law of some other state, and in both
cases it was the law of plaintiffs home state and the forum.7 5 Moreover,
these latter two cases were both decided under the choice of law rules of
the same state and the latter case relied heavily on the former.76
2. MALPRACTICE SCREENING AND ARBITRATION LAWS
A group of cases concerning medical malpractice pre-litigation
screening procedures is of particular importance to the present and
future of interstate malpractice cases. Beginning in the 1970s and
1980s, a number of states enacted statutory schemes designed to lower
malpractice premiums and ultimately health care costs by requiring
some form of pre-litigation review of medical malpractice claims.77 To
what extent do these statutory schemes apply in other states having no
such statutes?
78
The answer depends in part on the language of the particular stat-
ute. The Maryland statute, for example, requires mandatory arbitration
as a condition to bringing an "action or suit . . . in any court of this
State."79 This explicit language greatly aids in determining the applica-
bility of this statute in the courts of another state. 80 Other statutes, how-
ever, have no such limiting language,8" and courts must therefore
perform a choice of law analysis. An examination of the cases that do
not characterize screening statutes as procedural reveals a clear trend. In
the majority of cases, the law of the state in which the treatment
occurred applies. The place of treatment is usually also the physician's
home state.82 Thus, if the physician has his or her office in a state that
74. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. See Safer, 715 A.2d at 364 ("we adopt and apply the Schum analysis and result").
77. As a part of such measures, or sometimes as a separate piece of legislation, a number of
states enacted damage caps as well. This topic is to be considered in a later section. See infra
notes 187-246 and accompanying text.
78. Even when not directly applicable, it has been argued that compliance with a mandatory
arbitration statute extends the time for suit in another state. See Huang v. D'Albora, 644 A.2d 1,
2-3 (D.C. 1994); Cox v. Kaufman, 571 N.E.2d 1011, 1014-15 (11. App. Ct. 1991).
79. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(a)(2) (1991).
80. Several courts have relied on this particular or other similar statutory language to
conclude that another state's malpractice screening law does not apply or have characterized the
medical malpractice screening provisions of another state as procedural and thus not applicable.
See Huang v. D'Albora, 644 A.2d 1, 2-3 (D.C. 1994); Cox v. Kaufman, 571 N.E.2d 1011, 1015-
16 (11. App. Ct. 1991); Jenkins v. Cowen, 86-1988, 1987 WL 14601 at *1 (D.D.C. 1987); Ransom
v. Marrese, 501 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). But see Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639,
644 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
81. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 41A.016(1) (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2(A) (2000).
82. For examples of cases in which the physician rendered care outside his home state, see
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has a screening statute designed to protect health professionals, he or she
gets the benefit of that screening statute. However, health care providers
generally do not receive the benefit of a screening statute adopted in a
state where they do not practice, even if the case has other connections
to that state.
For example, in Edwardsville National Bank & Trust Co. v. Marion
Laboratories, Inc.," the defendants allegedly were negligent in their
treatment of an Illinois patient in Indiana, the state of their practice. The
injury to the patient, resulting in his death, also occurred in Indiana.84
Because the case's only connection with Illinois was the domicile of the
patient, the plaintiffs argued that Illinois would apply its own law to
protect a citizen against a screening statute favorable to nonresident
defendant.85 Rejecting this argument and using the "most significant
relationship" test of the Second Restatement as adopted by Illinois,86 the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the "most significant contacts require the
application of Indiana's law."87 Edwardsville demonstrates that the
domicile of plaintiff is not sufficient grounds for applying the plaintiff-
favoring law of that state. Other cases using a modem interest approach
bear this out by applying screening statutes from the place of treatment
in preference to the law of the plaintiffs home state.88
Other cases support application of the law of the place of treatment,
although in some of these cases, there are additional contacts with that
state. In Harper v. Silva,89 a Nebraska physician negligently treated a
Kansas patient in Kansas, where the physician was also licensed. The
court held that Kansas law applied because Kansas was the place of
injury, the plaintiff's domicile, and the physician's licensing state.90 In
Harper v. Silva, 399 N.W.2d 826 (Neb. 1987), discussed infra notes 89-90 and accompanying
text, and Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App. 1986), discussed infra notes 94-97 and
accompanying text.
83. 808 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 651.
85. Specifically, the plaintiffs argument was that "[g]iven the significant interest of Illinois in
compensating its domiciliaries for injury,' and that it has little incentive to limit tort recoveries
against non-domiciliaries, an Illinois court would, in all likelihood, apply Illinois law." Id.
86. Id. The court employed Illinois' choice of law rules because the case had been transferred
from Illinois to Indiana. See generally Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
87. Edwardsville, 808 F.2d at 651.
88. E.g., Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying Maryland
screening statute to a claim by a District of Columbia Plaintiff where Maryland was the place of
treatment); Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449, 454 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (using the place of injury
rule moderated by interest analysis to apply the place of the treatment); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Tetzlaff, 683 F. Supp. 223, 225-26 (D. Nev. 1988) (using an interest analysis approach to apply a
Nevada screening statute where treatment and injury were in Nevada and the only connection to
California was the domicile of the injured patient).
89. 399 N.W.2d 826 (Neb. 1987).
90. Id. at 828.
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Jenkins v. Cowen,9 a plaintiff from Indiana received treatment from the
defendant in both the District of Columbia and in Maryland. The court
applied the District of Columbia's screening statute over Maryland law,
which had no screening statute; the court reasoned that significant parts
of the treatment-the initial consultation, the decision to do multiple
surgeries, the decision to proceed without adequate informed consent,
and the follow up to the surgery-had occurred in the District of Colum-
bia.9" However, Jenkins is not a pure place of treatment case because
the court also found that the District of Columbia had a greater interest
than Maryland because of the defendant's incorporation in the District
and the presence of his office there.
93
On the other hand, when the treatment occurs in a state that does
not have a screening statute, the place of treatment rule means that the
defendant will not benefit from such a scheme. For example, in Wall v.
Noble,94 the Louisiana defendant had his principal office in Louisiana-
a state with a screening statute-and also had a satellite office in Texas.
The defendant examined the plaintiff in Texas, where the decision was
made to undergo surgery.95 Although the surgery itself was performed
in Louisiana, the plaintiff alleged that the negligent treatment was the
decision to undertake the surgery and thus occurred in Texas.96 Using
the most significant relationship test, the court applied Texas law.97
Wall presents a nice counterpart to cases such as Edwardsville. In
Edwardsville, the domicile of the plaintiff alone was not enough to man-
date the application of the plaintiff's home state's law; conversely, in
Wall, the defendant-physician's domicile and the presence of his princi-
pal office in a state with a screening statute was not enough to trigger the
application of that state's law.
While the place of treatment is usually also the place of injury, this
is not always the case. For example, the physician's negligence may be
in misdiagnosing a disease. In such a case, the injury will not occur
until it has ripened, which may well occur in the plaintiff's home state.
Where the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-screening state and the injury
occurs there, are these two contacts enough to offset the application of
the law of the place of the negligent treatment? Under these facts, the
cases still generally apply the law of the place of treatment. In Castelli
91. No. Civ.A. 86-1988, 1987 WL 14601 (D.D.C. Jul. 17, 1987).
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *3. For further discussion of residence consideration see infra notes 126, 158-162,
232-233 and accompanying text.
94. 705 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App. 1986).
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v. Steele,98 an Illinois patient obtained kidney treatment in Indiana.
Thereafter, she developed an abscessed kidney, allegedly due to bad
advice given in Indiana.9 9 Despite the fact that the injury arose outside
of the state of Indiana, the court reasoned that Indiana law applied
because each act of negligence complained of occurred in Indiana.
This is probably the most important factor because Indiana doctors
are strictly regulated by the state of Indiana and must conform their
practices to the laws of this state. Additionally, defendant Steele, his
corporation, and all the other doctors in the corporation are Indiana
residents. The doctor-patient relationship was initiated in Indiana,
and all of the diagnosis and treatment was rendered in Indiana. The
mere fact that plaintiff resided in Illinois and might.well have devel-
oped her injuries there does not outweigh the more significant Indi-
ana contacts. 100
Generally, the cases, consistent with Castelli, create a rule that the
law applied on the issue of medical malpractice screening will be the
law of the place of treatment, regardless of the place of injury. 01 Refus-
ing to accord greater weight to the place of injury than to the place of
treatment is the correct analysis. The type of case under consideration
involves a plaintiff and a physician from different states. Whether the
injury occurs in the state of treatment (as in the case of a negligently
performed procedure) or in the plaintiff's state after returning from the
treatment (as in the case of misdiagnosis), giving controlling weight to
the place of injury simply gives double consideration to either the place
of treatment or the state of the plaintiff's domicile as the injury will
surely occur in one of those two states. 10 2 Moreover, it is unclear why a
98. 700 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
99. Id. at 454.
100. Id. at 454-55. See also Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("attempt[ing] to separate the place where the injury occurred from the place where the negligence
took place makes no sense in the context of an alleged failure to diagnose a slowly growing brain
tumor").
101. See Bledsoe, 849 F.2d at 642; Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 1986).
But see Capone v. Nadig, 963 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D. N.J. 1997) (finding alleged malpractice and
injury occurred in state of physician's office even though symptoms stemming from physician's
failure to diagnose disease manifested themselves in other state).
102. See Blakesley, 789 F.2d at 241 (discounting the significance of the effects of the injury
being in the Plaintiffs home state because "looking to the place where the effects of an injury will
be felt gives improper additional weight to the factor of the plaintiffs state of residence"). But see
Workman v. Chinchinian, 807 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Wash. 1992):
[A] more practical approach in a medical malpractice case such as this, where the
injury is caused by delayed diagnosis, would be to find the residence of the plaintiff
as the place of the injury. To base the determination regarding place of the injury
on such adventitious circumstances as the place where the plaintiff undergoes
subsequent treatment would frustrate any hope of predictability in determining
choice of law problems.
Id. at 638.
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case like Edwardsville-where the treatment and injury occurred in the
same state-should have a different result than Castelli-where the
facts were identical except that the injury occurred after the plaintiff
returned home. The place where the injury manifests itself is arbitrary.
Using a place of injury approach would result in one choice of law result
for negligent failure to diagnose (the plaintiff's home state) and another
for negligent performance of a medical procedure (the defendant's home
state), without a principled reason for such a distinction.
These cases are true conflicts: the home state of each party is inter-
ested in applying its own law. 103 Neither state loses its interest because
the injury is shifted to another state. The harm to the plaintiff will in the
long run be experienced in his home state, regardless of where the initial
physical manifestation of injury occurs. The patient will sooner or later
return to the home state or, in a wrongful death case, the home state
likely is where the decedent's survivors live. On the other hand, the
failure to apply a state's screening statute to a physician practicing in
that state harms the state's interests in regulating medical care. There-
fore, focusing on the injury to the plaintiff does not make the conflict go
away because the application of either law results in one state losing.
In a true conflict, it is necessary to have a tiebreaker. 104 Otherwise,
each forum will apply its own law, thus 10 5 turning the case into a juris-
dictional struggle. Because the personal or domiciliary approach has
failed to decide the choice of law issue in these true conflicts, the
tiebreaker necessarily will be territorial in nature. The only two candi-
dates for such a territorial tiebreaker are the place of treatment and the
place of injury. I believe that the place of treatment offers a superior
tiebreaker. The cases generally support this view.
A place of treatment tiebreaker no more offends the state interests
than a place of injury tiebreaker because either rule advances one state's
interests and disables the other. Unlike the place of injury rule, how-
103. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Tetzlaff, 683 F. Supp. 223 (D. Nev. 1988).
The Court further determines that both California and Nevada have an interest
in application of their respective laws in the present case. California's interest
involves the speedy and efficient resolution of medical malpractice actions; it
involves, moreover, the efficacious placement of liability with the party legally
responsible for injury caused to California citizens through medical malpractice.
Nevada's interest involves the protection of its health care providers from frivolous
medical malpractice claims. This interest is tied closely to the interest of controlling
malpractice insurance rates and ultimately the cost of health care. A true conflict
exists.
Id. at 226.
104. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
105. Each state applying its own law if it were the forum was the approach originally
suggested by Brainerd Currie, the inventor of interest analysis. See CURRIE, supra note 35.
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ever, the place of treatment rule serves to uphold the parties' expecta-
tions. Whether people actually have expectations about the applicable
law is a great unanswered empirical question; yet, intuition has led many
to assume that people do not have any actual expectations in tort
cases. 10 6 Still, even assuming that a patient sitting in a physician's wait-
ing room is not contemplating choice of law, the place of treatment rule
upholds what Willis Reese calls "natural expectations."1 0 7 These are the
after-the-fact assumptions that the parties and the public-at-large would
have about the case.'08 Fairness also seems best served by a rule that
allows a party who does not stray from his or her home to benefit from
his or her own state's laws."° Conversely, the party who goes to
another state should bear the burden of any differences in the laws of
that state. 0 One factor in assessing choice of law under the Second
Restatement, which also finds expression in the malpractice cases, is the
place of the relationship between the parties.11 ' The place of treatment
rule best reflects the preference for the place where the relationship
between the parties is centered.
The superiority of the place of treatment tiebreaker over the place
of injury tiebreaker is illustrated by several cases applying the traditional
lex loci delecti test to screening statutes. Under this approach, the court
looks to the place of injury as the sole determinant of choice of law.
106. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 399 (N.Y. 1969).
107. See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315,
329-30 (1972).
108. Id. at 329-30.
[Natural expectations are] the expectations that [parties] presumably would have
had if their minds had been directed to the issue at hand. Expectations of the first
type are often encountered in such areas as contracts, trusts, and marriage.
Expectations of the second type are also significant. To foster public confidence
and respect, it is important that the law reach results appealing to common sense,
and a person is likely to think that a result makes sense if it is one he would have
anticipated had he thought about the question beforehand. This, of course, is as true
in choice of law as it is in any other legal field. It is desirable, in other words, that a
person's rights and duties should be determined under a law whose application he
had reason to expect.
Id.
109. See Capone v. Nadig, 963 F. Supp. 409, 413 (D. N.J. 1997) ("[B]y entering the state...
the visitor has exposed himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject persons
living there to a financial hazard that their law had not created.") (quoting D. F. Cavers, THE
CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 146-47 (1965)).
110. See Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[P]atients are inherently on
notice that journeying to new jurisdictions may expose them to new rules. The maxim 'When in
Rome do as the Romans do' bespeaks the common sense view that it is the traveler who must
adjust.") (Williams, J., concurring).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECoND), supra note 14, at § 145; see Jenkins v. Cowen, No. Civ.A. 86-
1988, 1987 WL 14601, at *3 (D.D.C. July 17, 1987); Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex.
App. 1986).
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Whether a screening statute applies depends on whether the injury
occurred in the state of treatment or in the plaintiff's home state after
returning there. For example, in Knoblett v. Kinman," 12 the plaintiff was
taken from his native Illinois to an Indiana hospital for treatment of a
broken arm. 13 After receiving treatment and returning home, the plain-
tiff learned that he had suffered nerve damage.114 The court found the
place of injury to be in Indiana and thus applied Indiana's screening
statute.' 15 However, if the court had determined that the nerve damage
occurred after the plaintiffs return to Illinois, the screening statute
would not have applied. The court thus based its decision on a difficult
fact question-the place of onset of the nerve damage-that had no pol-
icy implications for the choice of law issues in the case.
Similarly, in Salazar v. United States"6 the patient originally was
treated in Kansas by a physician who then consulted with a Nebraska
physician." 7 The Nebraska physician gave instructions for treating the
patient while he was in the Kansas hospital and while he was transported
via helicopter to Nebraska." 8 When the patient arrived in Nebraska, his
hand had become necrotic, allegedly due to negligent instructions given
by the Nebraska physician to the nurse accompanying the patient on the
flight." 9 The court applied the Kansas place of the tort rule, and, with
little analysis, concluded that Kansas law applied.' In choosing Kan-
sas law, the court may have misapplied Kansas choice of law: the court
phrased the test as the place of the "tort" and applied Kansas law
because that was where the negligent acts occurred.' 2' The results of
this analysis may be defensible as an application of the place of treat-
ment rule. 2 2 However, if the court was really applying the traditional
place of injury rule, it would have had to determine precisely where on
the flight from Kansas to Nebraska the hand became necrotic-an enter-
prise that is both difficult 2 3 and irrelevant to the choice of law policies
112. 623 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
113. Id. at 806.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 807.
116. No.Civ.A. 86-4358-5, 1989 WL 117711 (D. Kan. Sept. 14, 1989).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id.
122. Note, however, that when the patient is in one state and the physician rendering advice is
in another, it is less than clear which state should be regarded being the place of treatment. This
has obvious implications for telemedicine, which are considered below. See infra note 288 and
accompanying text.
123. For another case involving facts that would be difficult to analyze under the place of the
injury rule, see Purnell v. United States, No. Civ. A. 86-4475, 1987 WL 11211 (E.D. Pa. May 21,
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involved. As another court said, an "attempt to separate the place where
the injury occurred from the place where the negligence took place
makes no sense in the context of an alleged failure to diagnose .... ,,24
The place of treatment rule offers a better tiebreaker than the place of
injury rule because determining the place of injury can be difficult, has
little bearing on choice of law polices, and it does not protect the parties'
expectations.
In contrast to the line of cases supporting a place of treatment rule,
some cases take a fundamentally different approach by preferring forum
law. This preference reflects a cruder form of interest analysis in which
a forum with an interest will always apply its own law without regard to
the interests of other states or to potential forum choice of law policies
that do not involve state interests." 5 Kentucky has the most naked forum
preference approach. It has explicitly taken a lex fori position-apply
the law of the forum whenever possible. 26 This approach has been
applied in the context of a malpractice screening statute. In Kennedy v.
Ziesmann,127 a Kentucky patient consulted with an Ohio physician at a
satellite office that the physician maintained in Kentucky.1 28 The con-
sultation ultimately led to an operation in Ohio, which gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim.1 29 The court held that Kentucky law applied not only
to the physician who had the satellite office in Kentucky, but also to
another physician with no apparent connections to Kentucky and to the
Ohio hospital where the surgery was performed. 3 ° In part, the court
1987) where a patient died from a hemorrhage caused by a prescription after taking the medication
and traveling through several states.
124. Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying the law of the place of
treatment, which was also place of defendant's residence and practice, in a failure to diagnose
case); see also 789 Capone v. Nadig, 963 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D. N.J. 1997) (rejecting argument
that injury necessarily occurred in plaintiff's home state when symptoms arose in a failure to
diagnose case). But see Workman v. Chinchinian, 807 F. Supp. 634, 638 (E.D. Wash. 1992):
[A] more practical approach in a medical malpractice case such as this, where the
injury is caused by delayed diagnosis, would be to find the residence of the plaintiff
as the place of the injury. To base the determination regarding place of the injury
on such adventitious circumstances as the place where the plaintiff undergoes
subsequent treatment would frustrate any hope of predictability in determining
choice of law problems.
Id. at 638.
125. Examples of such forum choice of law policies include uniformity of outcome and
upholding expectations.
126. On Kentucky choice of law and the lexi fori approach in general, see Foster v. Leggett,
484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
127. 522 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
128. Id. at 730.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 731-32.
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reasoned that the Ohio screening scheme was contrary to Kentucky pub-
lic policy. 131
Ziesmann stands for the proposition that the domicile of the plain-
tiff standing alone may be a sufficient basis upon which to apply the law
of the plaintiff's home state. 32 This proposition is directly at odds with
the cases earlier discussed.1 33 Such a rule should not be favored. It
makes the outcome of the issue-and perhaps the case-dependent on
whether the plaintiff can get jurisdiction over the defendant in the plain-
tiff's home state. While applying the forum's law furthers the domestic
policies of the forum, it does so at the expense of the polices of a sister
state, which may have more connections to the case. It assumes that
Kentucky has no multistate policies, that is, no polices that call for limit-
ing the application of Kentucky law in deference to concerns of fairness
to outsiders, expectations of the parties, and the interests of other states.
Similar to Ziesmann is Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health
Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman.134 In that case, the Virginia plaintiff received
treatment in a Virginia clinic which was operated by a HMO headquar-
tered in the District of Columbia. 35 The court, using interest analysis,
declined to apply Virginia's screening statute and instead applied the
law of the District of Columbia in part because of plaintiff's employ-
ment there. 136 According to the court, plaintiffs employment in the
District of Columbia gave the District an interest in her welfare. 137 This
reasoning is analogous to that in Ziesmann, where the court applied
forum law to benefit a forum domiciliary. Although the plaintiff was a
"local" in a less profound sense than that of domicile, 38 the analytic
underpinnings of the two cases are the same: apply forum law favorable
to local plaintiffs. Whatever one thinks of the propriety of applying
forum law to benefit domiciliaries, one must question whether the plain-
tiff's employment is a sufficiently sturdy connection with the forum to
characterize her as a "local."'
139
In applying the District of Columbia's law, the court also consid-
131. Id.
132. Although one of the defendants had an office in Kentucky where plaintiff initially sought
treatment, the others did not have any contact with the state. See id.
133. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
134. 491 A.2d 502 (D.C. 1985).
135. Id. at 505.
136. Id. at 510.
137. Id.
138. In this case, the individual within the District of Columbia is "a member of its workforce
who contract[ed] for health services with a District of Columbia Corporation." Id.
139. The court characterized the place of treatment as a mere "happenstance," because the
defendant operated facilities in both the District and in Virginia. Plaintiff could just as easily have
sought treatment in the District clinic closest to her workplace. Id. at 58.
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ered that the HMO was headquartered in the District of Columbia. This
was said to give rise to a forum interest in "holding its corporations
liable for the full extent of the negligence attributable to them."' 40 Thus,
the domiciliary interest in Stutsman is not just the desire of the forum to
benefit a local plaintiff, but it is also the desire to burden, or regulate, a
local defendant. In the cases previously discussed, regulation of the
defendant was justified by the defendant's treatment of a patient within
the state. In Stutsman, the court substituted local corporate presence for
the place of treatment as a basis for regulating the defendant. Based on
this analysis, the court concluded that the case was a false conflict; "Vir-
ginia's interest would in fact be well-served, and its public policy not
contravened, by the application of District law to the action."14' Vir-
ginia was only interested, the court said, in protecting its health care
providers. Although the Virginia Malpractice Act applies to health care
providers licensed in Virginia, "the state's interest in the application of
its statute becomes attenuated when its intended beneficiaries are foreign
corporations with principal place of business outside the state."'142
It is true that the District of Columbia had an interest in Stutsman,
although one might wonder to what extent a legislature has non-resident
workers in mind when it legislates.143 What is troublesome is the
court's assertion that Virginia lacked an interest. Virginia enacted the
screening statute to keep down medical costs. If the statute does not
apply to a situation such as Stutsman where the treatment was rendered
in Virginia, that goal will be undermined. While the screening statute
directly benefits health providers, the ultimate and intended beneficiaries
of the sought-after lower medical costs were Virginia consumers of
medical services. Thus, the absence of a Virginia corporate defendant
does not mean that Virginia lacks an interest. Virginia still has an inter-
est because higher recoveries on interstate cases like Stutsman would
tend to increase costs to other Virginia consumers who receive medical
care from the same physicians.
In contrast to Stutsman, other cases have applied the screening stat-
ute of the state in which the treatment occurred even when the defendant
140. Id. at 509-10.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. One can also question the District of Columbia's interest in burdening its local defendant
with higher liability. The court noted that Virginia law in this case operated to the detriment of
the Virginia plaintiff by limiting compensation and used that conclusion to argue that Virginia
lacked an interest in these circumstances. Id. at 510-11. But the same reasoning would lead to the
conclusion that the District had no interest in applying its higher recovery law to the detriment of a
local defendant. In short, since each state's law benefited the party from the other state, the court
could have categorized the problem before it as a case in which neither state had an interest.
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resided elsewhere. In Hill v. Morrison,1" the defendant resided in Kan-
sas but treated the Plaintiff at his office in Missouri. 14 5 The court, using
the most significant relationship approach of the Second Restatement,
held that the Missouri screening statute applied because Missouri was
the state with the most significant relationship to the injury and no other
state had an overriding interest.' 46 It is significant that while both par-
ties in Hill had some Missouri connections-the defendant had an office
there and the plaintiff was a college student there-both were domiciled
in states that apparently had no screening statutes, Kansas and Tennes-
see respectively.' 47 Applying the screening statute makes sense on such
facts: Missouri had an interest despite the absence of a local domiciliary
because other Missouri patients, who would presumably constitute the
bulk of patients at defendant's Missouri office, would benefit from
lower medical costs produced by a lower recovery in the case."'
This interest was recognized in Packer v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 49 which involved a fact
pattern similar to Stutsman: a Virginia patient was treated in Virginia by
a physician employed by a HMO headquartered in the District of
Columbia.'50 The court concluded that Virginia had superior interests
and applied that state's screening statute. 15 1 Packer can be distinguished
from Stutsman because of the absence of plaintiff contacts with the
forum in Packer. In Stutsman, the plaintiff was employed in the Dis-
trict; the court reasoned that the contact gave the District an interest in
protecting her.'52 The District had no such contacts with the plaintiff in
Packer. 53 The court therefore was left with only the defendant-regulat-
ing interest set out in Stutsman. The court found this interest to be insuf-
ficient to overcome Virginia's interest in keeping down health care
costs.' 5 4 Unlike the court in Stutsman, the court in Packer recognized
that a screening statute is designed to benefit citizens of the state gener-
ally by assuming that medical services in the state are available in the
future. 15
5
144. 870 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
145. Id. at 980.
146. Id. at 981.
147. Id. at 980.
148. The court identifies Missouri's interest as "the increased cost of health care and the
continued integrity of that system of essential services." Id. at 981.
149. 728 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1989).
150. Id. at 9.
151. See id. at 11-12.
152. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
153. See Packer, 728 F. Supp. at 9.
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 11 n.5.
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Similarly, in Bledsoe v. Crowley,5 6 a District of Columbia plaintiff
sued two Maryland psychiatrists in the District of Columbia for failing
to diagnose a brain tumor.' 57 The defendants were licensed in both
jurisdictions, but all treatment occurred in Maryland.'58 The court held
that Maryland's screening statute should apply because the "state where
the defendant's conduct occurs has the dominant interest in regulating
it."' 59 A concurring opinion agreed that Maryland law should govern
because of the "systemic interests in ... states' being able to develop
coherent policies governing medical malpractice liability and ... indi-
viduals' being able to take advantage of medical services outside their
home jurisdictions.' 60 The concurrence reasoned that the first interest
cannot be served if the law is determined by the plaintiffs domicile,
because then some portion of the medical services that the state's physi-
cians render will be subject to a higher liability regime.16  Health pro-
fessionals would avoid this exposure by refusing to take interstate
patients-an outcome at odds with the second interest.1 6 1 Thus, the best
choice of law rule is the place of the treatment.
1 63
On the whole, the cases support a place of treatment rule in the
application of screening statutes. A place of injury rule would artifi-
cially divide cases into two categories depending on whether the injury
manifested itself at once or after the plaintiff had returned home. A rule
basing choice of law on the plaintiffs domicile, while serving to further
the interests of the plaintiffs home state, would undermine attempts by
states with screening statutes to lower the costs of health care. A plain-
tiff's domicile choice of law rule would also frustrate expectations; it
would be better to place the burden of coming under foreign law on the
party-the patient-who chooses to seek a benefit from that state. This
latter factor not only upholds parties' expectations it also prevents a
freeloading problem: patients who seek medical services in a state other
than their home are seeking a beneficial relationship in that state. In
states with screening statutes, one such benefit is a lower cost of medical
services.' 6 4 Thus, plaintiffs who urge the application of their home
156. 849 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 640. The plaintiff was a Maryland resident at the time of the first treatment and
subsequently moved to the District of Columbia. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 643 (quoting Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 146 cmt. d (1969)).
160. Bledsoe, 849 F.2d at 646 (Williams, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 647.
163. Id.
164. At least the legislatures of such states believe this benefit will be achieved. Whether in
fact it is achieved is an empirical question beyond the scope of this article.
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state's law are trying to receive a benefit from the state of the treatment
without carrying the corresponding burden; the cost of their care is in
effect being subsidized by other patients who are receiving lower mal-
practice recoveries.
3. INFORMED CONSENT
A relatively small number of cases address what law should apply
when medical services were performed without adequate informed con-
sent. In general, the cases apply the law of the state where the consulta-
tion providing the information occurred.
If the defendant doctor acted in his own state of licensure and the
only contact with another state is the plaintiff's domicile there, the law
of the defendant's state should apply. For example in Knight v. Depart-
ment of Army,'65 the plaintiff, a resident of Alabama, was initially
treated for a heart condition in Georgia.'66 He was told that he needed
further care and could receive it in either Georgia, the District of Colum-
bia, or Texas.' 6 7 The plaintiff chose to go to Texas where, during the
course of treatment, he underwent a blood transfusion that was later
found to have contained the AIDS virus.'68 Plaintiff sued for failure to
inform him of the risk of HIV infection.'69 The court concluded that
Texas's law applied in preference to Alabama's partly because of the
expectations of the parties: the plaintiff and the physicians reasonably
could expect only the law of Texas to apply because the treatment was
given in that state. 170 Moreover, although the plaintiffs home state had
an interest in assuring that their citizen was adequately compensated,
Texas had a more compelling interest in "seeing that surgeons practicing
in Texas comply with reasonable standards of their profession." 171
Even if the defendant's contacts with the plaintiff's home state are
greater, the law of the state of treatment still applies. In Blakesley v.
Wolford,171 the patient had initially consulted with the defendant while
the defendant was in the plaintiff's home state on other business. 173 The
defendant generally outlined the medical procedure, but told the patient
that the procedure would have to be done in Texas, where the defendant
had his practice. 74 The plaintiff then went to Texas where the defen-
165. 757 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
166. Id. at 791.
167. Id. at 791-92.
168. Id. at 792.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 793.
171. Id.
172. 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 237.
174. Id.
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dant again explained the operation. 75 Relying on the choice of law
principle that a party acting in his own home state (here the physician) is
entitled to the application of his home state's law that tends to protect
him, the court concluded that Texas law applied despite the initial con-
tacts in Pennsylvania between the parties.176 Behind this conclusion,
however, lies a decision about whether the defendant truly is a stay-at-
home party. After all, he ventured into another state and made contact
with the patient there. One could characterize the defendant as having
reached out beyond his state, thus subjecting himself to foreign law. 177
Similarly, the plaintiff could be viewed as the party who stayed at home
until lured into another state by the defendant. The court responded to
such concerns by characterizing the initial consultation as too insignifi-
cant a connection to require that all subsequent conduct be measured by
the law of the state where that initial contact occurred. 17 8 The plaintiff
was told that the operation would have to be in Texas and voluntarily
choose to go there.
179
The only case that is perhaps inconsistent with this approach is
Hitchcock v. United States. 180 The plaintiff in Hitchcock had allegedly
received a rabies immunization without adequate warnings. 81 Although
the immunization occurred in Virginia, the decision about what risks to
disclose were made by the defendant (the United States government) in
the District of Columbia; for that reason, the court applied the law of the
District of Columbia. 82 Although the case could be read as a departure
from the place of treatment rule, it an also be read to support a rule
applying the law of the place where the defendant acted. Hitchcock is
therefore a refinement of the place of treatment rule, taking into account
that the defendant's negligent conduct was not in the state of treatment.
The place of treatment rule makes sense for informed consent
cases. It is assumed in these cases that the parties are from different
states. When the physician's home state has a standard more protective
of him, the case will present a true conflict between the interests of the
175. Id.
176. Id. at 242 ("when a defendant acts within his home state, he may properly rely on that
state's defendant-protecting law").
177. Cf Scharfman by Scharfman v. Nat'l Jewish Hosp. & Research Ctr. 506 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (finding that Colorado defendant's screening of potential patients in New
York office added to "significant contacts" with New York and subjecting defendant to New York
law); Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex. App. 1986) (applying Texas substantive law
where physician and patient made medical decision in physician's Texas office even though
surgery occurred in other state).
178. Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 242 (3rd Cir. 1986).
179. Id. at 243.
180. 665 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
181. Id. at 355.
182. Id. at 360-61.
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two states. 183 Such cases need a tie-breaker, and the place of the defen-
dant's conduct is preferable to the place where the injury manifests
itself.184 This result also upholds the expectations-or presumed expec-
tations-of the parties. 85 On the other hand, if the law of the defen-
dant's home is more favorable to the plaintiff, that state will have an
interest in attaching tort liability to deter conduct falling below the stan-
dard of care. 1
8 6
4. DAMAGES ISSUES
This section reviews cases dealing with damages issues. Some of
these cases overlap with those considered under malpractice screening
laws because they involve a damages cap that is imposed by a malprac-
tice tort reform statute.' 87 Others deal with damages issues that could
arise in any tort case, such as the heads of damages recoverable in a
survival action. 1
88
To clarify the analysis, the cases are broken into two major groups.
One group involves true conflicts. In this group, the state of the defen-
dant's practice limits damages more than the home state of the plaintiff
does. The other group involves what appear to be unprovided-for cases:
the defendant's state allows more liberal damages, ostensibly to protect
a plaintiff, but there is no local plaintiff to be protected; the plaintiff's
state has a limitation on damages, ostensibly to protect defendants, but
there is no local defendant to protect. Both groups of cases need a
tiebreaker. This section attempts to identify and catalogue the
tiebreakers selected by the courts in these two groups of cases.
In cases where the defendant's state allows fuller recovery than the
plaintiffs state, one could say that neither state has an interest in apply-
ing its law.'8 9 To overcome this apparent anomaly in such cases, the
courts have engaged in a common mode of interest analysis and trans-
formed the defendant's state's apparent pro-plaintiff policy (higher dam-
ages) into a defendant-regulating policy. By making this shift, the
defendant's state acquires an interest in regulating or deterring a local
183. See Blakesley, 789 F.2d at 240; Knight v. Dep't of Army, 757 F. Supp. 790, 793 (W.D.
Tex. 1991).
184. See, e.g., Blakesley, 789 F.2d at 241. See also supra notes 101-124 and accompanying
text.
185. See Knight, 757 F. Supp. at 793.
186. See Hitchcock, 665 F.2d at 360 (the state had an "interest in having its law applied to
decide the liability of a business headquartered there").
187. See, e.g., Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 506
(D.C. 1985).
188. See Capone v. Nadig, 963 F. Supp. 409, 412 (D. N.J. 1997).
189. Brainerd Currie suggested that in such cases the forum apply its own law by default. See
Currie, supra note 35.
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defendant by awarding higher damages to the plaintiff. For example, in
Workman v. Chinchinian,190 an Idaho plaintiff sued a Washington defen-
dant for failing to diagnose a tumor. 9' While Washington, the defen-
dant's state, allowed full recovery for tort victims, Idaho, the plaintiffs
state, placed a cap on damages.192 The court applied Washington law to
the benefit of the foreign plaintiff because the "primary purpose" of the
Washington "policy is to deter wrongful conduct."' 93 The policy was
thus found to be defendant-oriented, and because there was a Washing-
ton defendant, Washington had an interest. Idaho, on the other hand,
lacked an interest in applying its cap on damages because that law was
designed to "protect Idaho defendants and their insurance carriers, not
Washington residents and their insurance carriers."' 9 4 Thus, the case
became a simple false conflict. This is the pattern followed by the other
potential unprovided-for damages cases-cases where each party is ben-
efited by the other party's domiciliary law. 195
These cases take a few analytic gyrations but may be restated rather
simply: when the plaintiff's home state allows less liberal damages than
the place of treatment, apply the law of the place of treatment. Moreo-
ver, the state with the higher damages standards will always have an
interest in interstate malpractice cases. If it is also the home state of the
plaintiff, then it has an interest in seeing its citizens fully compensated.
If instead it is the state in which the physician practices, it has a regula-
tory interest.
A somewhat larger group of cases deals with the perhaps more vex-
190. 807 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
191. Id. at 637.
192. Id. at 640.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. In Estate of Sullivan v. United States, 777 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ind. 1991), the plaintiff was
from a state that capped damages in medical malpractice cases but was mistreated in Arizona, a
state with no cap. Id. at 697. The court applied Arizona law because Arizona "has an interest in
ensuring the quality of those medical practitioners employed in a Veterans Administration hospital
in Arizona and is free to choose to not enact a medical malpractice liability cap as a means of
protecting its interests." Id. at 702. Likewise, in Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan,
Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502 (D.C. 1985), the court applied the more liberal damages law of the
District of Columbia to the benefit of a Virginia plaintiff because the corporate defendant health
care provider was headquartered in the District. The court found that the "District has a
significant interest, reflected in the fact that it imposes no cap on liability for malpractice, in
holding its corporations liable for the full extent of the negligence attributable to them." Id. at
509-10. Moreover, the District of Columbia had an interest in protecting the plaintiff because she
worked there. Id. at 510. One might also add to this group Lasley v. Georgetown University, 842
F. Supp. 593 (D. D.C. 1994). The court in that case applied the law of the place of defendant's
practice because it had a "significant interest in holding its health care providers liable for the full
extent of the negligence attributable to them." Id. at 595.n. 1. The choice of law statements in the
case, however, appear as dicta because on the damages question the law of the two jurisdictions
was the same. See id. at 595.
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ing situation presented when each state's law favors the party from that
state. In these cases, the physician is from a state that caps damages or
applies some other rule disallowing certain types of damages. The
plaintiff hails from a state that has no cap and permits fuller relief.
These cases present classic true conflicts. Either the defendant's state
will not be able to protect its citizen as it would like or the plaintiff's
state will not be able to provide what it believes to be full compensation
for its citizen. If we simply throw up our hands and advise each state to
apply its own law, 196 the outcome of the case will turn on personal juris-
diction and forum shopping. Once again, we need a tiebreaker.
In the true conflict cases that I have found, one group of courts did
in fact give up on a solution and applied forum law. A much larger
group of cases used as a tiebreaker either the place of treatment rule or
the plaintiffs domicile rule.
Of the cases that simply apply forum law, one is the notorious and
much criticized Rosenthal v. Warren.97 In Rosenthal, a New York
patient sought and obtained treatment from a Massachusetts physician in
Massachusetts. 98 Massachusetts had a cap on wrongful death damages;
New York had none. 99 The court found that New York law, the law of
the forum,2 0 should apply because the Massachusetts damages limita-
tion "is one not based upon logic, reason or social policy,"20 but is
instead "absurd and unjust."202 The reasoning amounts to selecting the
law of the forum: if Massachusetts had been the forum, one would
hardly expect a Massachusetts court to conclude that its own laws are
"absurd and unjust."2 °3 This is illustrated by Petrella v. Kashlan, the
other case relying on a preference for forum law." In Petrella, the
Florida mother of a Florida decedent sued in New Jersey for malpractice
alleged to have occurred in New Jersey while her son was temporarily in
that state.2"5 Florida law allowed a parent to recover in wrongful death
actions for their mental pain and suffering; New Jersey law did not allow
196. This was of course the initial position of interest analysis. See supra note 38.
197. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973). For criticism of Rosenthal, see Willis L.M. Reese,
Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1605-06 (1978).
198. Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 439.
199. Id. at 439.
200. The case was filed in federal district court in New York as a diversity case. The court was
therefore applying New York choice of law principles. Id. at 440.
201. Id. at 445.
202. Id. (quoting Justice Hatch in Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 39 N.Y.S. 613, 616
(1896), quoted in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40 (1966)).
203. To the same effect is Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, 482 F. Supp. 629, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), which applied the law of the plaintiff's domicile as against the place of the treatment,
which had a charitable immunity rule, on the ground that the latter rule was "unfair and unjust."
204. 826 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1987).
205. Id. at 1341.
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206such recovery. The court recognized the true conflict and resolved it
by defaulting to forum law: "New Jersey's interest in this case is no less
than Florida's and the judge correctly held that its law of damages
should be applied. '20 7 Rosenthal and Petrella succinctly illustrate the
problem with simply applying forum law in true conflicts. The plaintiff
wins if he or she can get jurisdiction at home (Rosenthal). If the plain-
tiff cannot do so the defendant wins (Petrella).
20 8
The remaining cases seek a solution that does not depend upon the
identity of the forum. The dominant approach is to use the place of the
treatment to resolve the true conflict. For example, in Kenerson v. Ste-
venson, 2 09 a Maine patient was injured and subsequently died following
treatment in a New Hampshire Hospital by a New Hampshire physi-
cian.2 ° New Hampshire law did not allow punitive damages; appar-
ently Maine law did. 21 1 The plaintiffs Maine domicile was "the sole
significant contact with the state of Maine."2" 2 Using the Second
Restatement's most significant relationship test, the Maine court held
that New Hampshire law applied.2 t3
Other cases applying the place of treatment approach do so, in part,
to uphold the expectations of a defendant who does not venture outside
his state's boundaries. In Blakesley v. Wolford,21 4 the court applied the
damages law2t 5 of the place of treatment rather than the more liberal law
of the plaintiffs domicile because "when a defendant acts within his
206. Id. at 1342.
207. Id. at 1343.
208. In fact, the jurisdictional basis in Rosenthal for the New York suit against the
Massachusetts physician is weak under today's standards. The court had relied on attaching
insurance obligations of the Defendant in New York. Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 440. Such a
jurisdictional basis is no longer valid under the due process clause. See Rush v. Savchuck, 444
U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980).
209. 621 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Me. 1985). A fuller statement of the facts of the case is found in
an earlier opinion on jurisdiction. See Kenerson v. Stevenson, 604 F. Supp. 792 (D. Me. 1985).
210. Kenerson, 621 F. Supp. at 1181.
211. Id. It should be noted, however, that New Hampshire allowed for "liberal compensatory
damages" when the defendant's acts are "wanton, malicious or oppressive." Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. To the same effect is Rieger v. Group Health Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Miss.
1994). In that case, the plaintiff had received treatment from a Maryland physician while living in
Maryland and then moved to Mississippi. Id. at 789-90. Maryland capped non-economic
damages; Mississippi did not. Id. at 791. In applying the most significant relationship test, the
court concluded the Maryland cap should apply. Id. at 790, 792. In Rieger, as in Kenerson, the
sole connection the state with higher standards of damages had to the case was that it was the
domicile of the plaintiff. Likewise, in Perloff v. Symmes Hospital, 487 F. Supp. 426 (D. Mass.
1980), the sole connection to the state with the more generous law of damages was that it was the
plaintiff's domicile; moreover, the plaintiff moved to that state after the events in question. Id. at
427-28. The court therefore discounted the plaintiffs domicile entirely. Id. at 429.
214. 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1986).
215. See id. at 240 for a description of the two states' damages laws.
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home state, he may properly rely on that. state's defendant-protecting
law." ' 6 Similarly, in Capone v. Nadig,217 the court faced a true conflict
between the less generous law of the state of treatment, which was
designed to afford "protection of its resident defendants from excessive
damage awards," ' 8 and the more generous law of the plaintiffs state,
which was based on the "primary interest in seeing that a decedent's
estate is justly compensated by a tortfeasor."21 9 The court applied the
law of the place of treatment, breaking the domiciliary tie by favoring
the party that stayed at home over the party that ventured out of state:
"it is only fair that the law of the state to which the patient has volunta-
rily traveled, and in which the doctor has chosen to [practice], be applied
to adjudicate the respective rights, duties, and obligations between the
parties." 220 Because the patient sought out the defendant in the defen-
dant's state of practice, the court concluded that the "relationship
between [the plaintiff] and the defendant was centered in" that state and
that state's law should apply.22'
Another group of cases takes a different approach, applying the law
of the plaintiff's home state rather than the law of the state where the
defendant's conduct occurred. However, most of these cases can be dis-
tinguished because of the uniqueness of the defendant. Three of the
cases were brought against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for malpractice committed by a medical employee of the
United States.222 In these cases, the place of treatment is much less
compelling as a tiebreaker because the defendant is the ultimate nation-
wide actor. Because the defendant is present and active in both the place
of treatment and in the plaintiffs home state, it is unlikely to have acted
in reliance on the local law of the place of treatment.
For example, in Pietrantonio v. United States,23 the plaintiff ini-
tially consulted with a Veterans Administration physician in his home
state of Michigan; this physician sent him for further treatment to a Vet-
erans Administration in Wisconsin. 224 The latter facility failed to diag-
216. Id. at 242 (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)).
217. 963 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.J. 1997).
218. Id. at 413.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 413-14 (quoting Blakesley, 789 F.2d at 243).
221. Id. at 414. See also Mascarella v. Brown, 813 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(choosing the locus of the alleged malpractice-the place of treatment-when the tortfeasor is
domiciled in that state to provide the law governing damages).
222. Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973); Pietrantonio v. United States,
827 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Merchs. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States,
272 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.D. 1967).
223. 827 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
224. Id. at 459-60.
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nose lung cancer in an X-ray taken there. 2 5 Wisconsin law placed a cap
on damages while Michigan law did not.22 6 Although this case could be
regarded as a true conflict because the plaintiff's home state allowed full
recovery and the state of the defendant's conduct limited recovery, ana-
lyzing the interests reveals only a doubtful interest on the part of the
state of the defendant's conduct. Wisconsin enacted its cap to protect
some class of defendants, presumably local ones, from excessive liabil-
ity; it is doubtful that the legislature intended to protect the U.S. govern-
ment as a defendant.227 For this reason, the court recognized Michigan's
interest, but made no mention of a Wisconsin interest.2 28 The court also
concluded that the Michigan plaintiffs expectations deserved protection
because he "did not go to Wisconsin except by referral from his Michi-
gan doctor. '229 Similarly, in Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. of
Fargo v. United States,2 30 a mental patient had been committed in his
native North Dakota and then transferred to a Veterans Administration
facility in South Dakota.23' He was negligently released from that facil-
ity and killed his North Dakota wife. 32 The court, characterizing the
mental patient's presence in South Dakota as "simply happenstance,"
found that South Dakota, which had a damage cap, had no interest in the
case while North Dakota had an interest in full recovery.2 3 3
The absence of a state interest in protecting the United States as a
defendant from unnecessary damages awards is also illustrated by
Tyminski v. United States. In Tyminski,234 the plaintiff received treat-
ment in New York and later moved to New Jersey, which allowed cer-
tain damages not available under New York law.235 In a case against a
defendant other than the United States, applying the interests of a state
to which the plaintiff elected to move after the conduct in question
would raise serious questions of fairness.236 But because of the national
scope of this defendant, such concerns were diminished. Likewise, the
225. Id. at 459.
226. Id. at 461.
227. For an example of an explicit consideration of whether the United States as a defendant is
within the scope of a damage-regulating statute, see Estate of Sullivan v. United States, 777 F.
Supp. 695, 702 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
228. Pietrantonio, 827 F. Supp. at 462.
229. Id.
230. 272 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.D. 1967).
231. Id. at 412.
232. Id. at 411.
233. Id. at 419, 420.
234. 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973).
235. Id. at 265. Specifically, New Jersey law allows for recovery of gratuitous nursing
services. Id.
236. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, (Cal. 1967) (declining to apply the law of a
later-acquired domicile to prevent forum shopping).
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state of New York had little interest in protecting the United States from
such damages.237
Outside the Federal Tort Claims Act context, only one case applies
the more liberal law of a plaintiff's home state over the law of the place
of treatment. In Haydu v. Hospital for Joint Diseases Orthopaedic Insti-
tute,2 38 the court applied plaintiff-favoring Connecticut damages law
239
even though the Connecticut patient had been treated by the New York
defendant solely in New York.24° The court relied on a pattern of New
York cases that it characterized as consistently calling for "application
of the law of the decedent's domicile" in wrongful death conflicts
cases. 41 The court also thought that applying the law of plaintiff's
domicile "encourages the use of New York medical facilities and there-
fore is in New York's interest.
242
If New York truly wanted to encourage out-of-state plaintiffs to
come into the state for treatment, a more direct route than a choice of
law rule would be to raise the permitted damages substantively. Moreo-
ver, the Haydu court's rationale does not take into account that it takes
two to have a physician-patient relationship. Although the court's
choice of law rule would encourage the patient to seek the relationship,
it would discourage the New York physician from accepting it. The
court's choice of law rule creates an incentive for physicians to decline
patients from those states that have more liberal damages laws. Signifi-
cantly physicians are more likely to be worried about post-care litigation
than the patients. Were a patient seriously contemplating possible litiga-
tion about the quality of the care, he or she would choose another physi-
cian. If providing medical care across state lines is an important policy,
then the better way to achieve it is by encouraging physicians to accept
out-of-state patients by protecting physicians with favorable home state
law.
24 3
In summary, the place of treatment rule generally predicts the result
of choice of law cases relating to damages issues. When the state of
treatment has higher damages, that state's law is applicable in order to
237. The court found that as to the award of damages, "there exists no object of wrongdoing
New York would have a particular interest in preventing." Tyminski, 481 F.2d at 267.
238. 557 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
239. Id. at 577.
240. Id. at 578.
241. Id. at 579.
242. Id. at 580.
243. Haydu has also been criticized as a misapplication of New York choice of law. See
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Garrett Corp., 625 F. Supp. 752, 762 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("[w]e agree with the Second Circuit that this [holding in Haydu] is unlikely to have been a New
York court's ruling in such a case") (citing O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842, 850
n.12 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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regulate the defendant's conduct.2 " When it is the plaintiff s home state
that has higher recovery, courts apply the law of the place of treatment
rule more often than either the rule favoring forum law245 or the rule
favoring the plaintiffs home state law.246
B. General Analysis
In this section, I analyze the choice of law outcomes of interstate
malpractice cases in the aggregate. That is, I attempt to make some
general observations about all the cases without regard to the specific
issue they present. To do so, I created several categories of choice of
law results. One category, for example, consists of cases applying the
law of the place of injury, the traditional choice of law rule until the
latter part of the twentieth century. Other categories are based on where
the treatment occurred and where the plaintiff was domiciled.
Of the cases in my database, I excluded eight from this analysis as
stating only dicta.24 7 Of the remaining cases, eleven apply forum law as
procedural. Most of these cases involve a statute of limitations, 248
although some involve characterization of other issues as procedural. 249
The group of cases dealing with various substantive issues then
remains.250 Of these cases, two large groups of about equal size are
easily identified.
One group consists of cases that apply the law of the place of treat-
ment even though the plaintiff was domiciled elsewhere and the law of
the plaintiffs state favored him or her. There are thirteen such cases. 251
244. See supra notes 89-195 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 222-243 and accompanying text.
247. See Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Zimbauer v. Milwaukee Orthopaedic Group, Ltd, 920 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Wis.
1996); Rosario v. United States, 824 F. Supp. 268 (D. Mass. 1993); Lindsey v. United States, 693
F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982);
Simon v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Carr v. Bio-Medical Applications of
Wash. Inc., 366 A.2d 1089, (D.C. 1976); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996).
248. See Cuthbertson v. Uhley, 509 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1975); Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d
839 (5th Cir. 1959); Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Mass. 1999); Weethee v. Holzer
Clinic, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 19 (W.Va. 1997); Huang v. D'Albora, 644 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1994); Cox v.
Kaufman, 571 N.E.2d 1011 (111. App. 1991); Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33 (D. S.C. 1976);
Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Conway v. Ogier, 184 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1961).
249. See Dill v. Scuka, 279 F.2d 145, 147 (3d Cir. 1960) (standard for sufficiency of
evidence); Ransom v. Marrese, 501 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (dealing with a malpractice
screening statute).
250. This group includes some additional statute of limitations cases in which the court
characterized statute of limitations as substantive, not procedural.
251. See Capone v. Nadig, 963 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.J. 1997); Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 63
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Given that each party is favored by his or her own state's law, these
cases are true conflicts. Because such cases cannot be resolved on the
basis of state interests (each state has one), another basis of decision
must be used. These cases use the place of treatment, which, as noted
above, serves to protect the expectations of the parties. 2
In contrast to the foregoing cases, another major group applies the
law of the plaintiffs domicile, in preference to the law of the place of
treatment, when each party is favored by his or her own state's law.
There are fourteen such cases.253 These cases also present true conflicts
but appear to resolve the conflict by applying the law of the plaintiffs
domicile. Upon closer examination, however, most of these cases
involve additional contacts between the defendant and the plaintiffs
home state. For example, in Wall v. Noble," 4 a Louisiana physician
performed surgery on the Texas plaintiff in Louisiana. However, the
physician also had a Texas office and it was in that office that the defen-
dant initially saw the plaintiff and gave her medical advice leading to the
surgery. 5 In Scharfinan by Scharfinan v. National Jewish Hospital &
Research Center,256 the court applied plaintiff-favoring New York law
to the benefit of a New York plaintiff against a Colorado hospital that
had provided treatment in Colorado. 57 The court relied on the fact that
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 841 F.2d 1062 (1 1th Cir. 1988);
Petrella v. Kashlan, 826 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1987); Edwardsville Natl. Bank and Trust Co. v.
Marion Labs. Inc., 808 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1987); Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.
1986); Bonerb v. Richard J. Caron Found., 159 F.R.D. 16 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Troxel v. A.I. duPont
Inst., 636 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Mascarella v. Brown, 813 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Tetzlaff, 683 F.
Supp. 223 (D. Nev. 1988); Perloff v. Symmes Hosp., 487 F. Supp. 426 (D. Mass. 1980); Conway
v. Ogier, 184 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). Another three cases apply the law of the place of
treatment as against the law of the plaintiff's domicile without making clear whether the plaintiff's
home state's law favored him. In each case, however, the law of the place of treatment did favor
the defendant. See Adams v. Harron, No. 97-2547, 1999 WL 710326 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999);
Hill v. Morrison, 870 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Kenerson v. Stevenson, 621 F. Supp. 1179
(D. Me. 1985).
252. See supra notes 104-111, 214-221 and accompanying text.
253. Kuehn v. Childrens Hosp. Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997); Dahlberg v.
Harris, 916 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1990); Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978); Tyminski v.
United States 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973); Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973);
Rieger v. Group Health Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Miss. 1994); Almonte v. N.Y. Med. Coll.
851 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994); Pietrantonio v. United States 827 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Mich.
1993); Haydu v. Hosp. for Joint Diseases Orthopaedic Inst. 557 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Kennedy v. Ziesmann, 522 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Holzsager v. Valley Hosp. 482 F. Supp.
629 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States 272 F. Supp.
409 (D. N.D. 1967); Scharfman by Scharfman v. Nat'l Jewish Hosp. & Research Ctr. 506 N.W.S.
2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App. 1986).
254. 705 S.W.2d at 727.
255. Id. at 733.
256. 506 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
257. Id. at 92.
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"from a New York office [the defendant] screens potential patients. 258
Thus, in addition to the plaintiffs residence acting as a contact with
New York, the "defendant's activities ... constitute[d] significant con-
tacts" with that state.2 59 In Schum v. Bailey,2 6° a New Jersey patient was
treated in New York by a New York defendant.26' The court applied
plaintiff-favoring New Jersey law, in part, because the defendant-physi-
cian was also licensed in New Jersey and had been on the staff of several
hospitals there. 262 Because the defendant had a local professional pres-
ence in the plaintiffs state, that state acquired an interest in addition to
the mere protection of the plaintiff.2 63 New Jersey also was interested in
applying its more rigorous laws to regulate the defendant's conduct in
order to deter substandard care.26
Another subgroup of these cases applying the law of the plaintiffs
domicile are Federal Tort Claims Act cases.265 When a defendant has a
nationwide presence, applying the plaintiffs state's law makes more
sense than in the usual malpractice case. In such cases, it is less realistic
to speak of the state of treatment as having an interest in protecting a
"local" defendant. Also, in each F.T.C.A. case the defendant certainly
had additional contacts in the plaintiffs home state. Thus, of the four-
teen cases initially noted, eight are removed from the sample on the
basis of additional defendant contacts.
Six cases remain that clearly favor the plaintiffs state over the
defendant's in a true conflict.2 66 In four of these cases, however, the
analysis used by the court focused less on the plaintiff's domicile than
on the forum. In these four cases the court applied the law of the forum,
which happened also to be the law of plaintiff's home state, because of
that law's substantive superiority.267 These cases establish a forum-pref-
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978).
261. Id. at 493.
262. Id. at 497.
263. Id.
264. Id. The other cases involving a true conflict and applying the law of the plaintiffs
domicile when the defendant has additional contacts in that state are Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital,
Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997) and Almonte v. New York Medical College, 851 F.
Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994).
265. See Pietrantonio v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Tyminski v.
United States, 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United
States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.D. 1967).
266. See Dahlberg v. Harris, 916 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1990); Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438
(2d Cir. 1973); Rieger v. Group Health Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Miss. 1994); Haydu v.
Hosp. for Joint Diseases Orthopaedic Inst., 557 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Kennedy v.
Ziesmann, 522 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 482 F. Supp. 629
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
267. See Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 445 (refusing to apply the law of the state of treatment because
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erence choice of law rule for true conflicts. If the plaintiff is unable to
secure jurisdiction in his or her home state and instead must file suit in
the physician's home state, a court in that state taking the same choice of
law approach would apply defendant-favoring forum law. Additionally,
two of these four cases can be classified in the preceding category of
cases-the defendant had additional contacts with the plaintiff's state-
because the court relied on such contacts in addition to its preference for
forum law.268
Thus, two cases appear to apply the law of the plaintiff's domicile
over the law of the place of treatment in a true conflict. In Dahlberg v.
Harris,2 69 the court held that a Wisconsin borrowing statute did not
require the forum court to adopt the defendant-favoring commencement
provision of the jurisdiction whose statute of limitations applied; rather,
the Wisconsin commencement provision was applicable.270 However,
this analysis was driven by analogous Wisconsin precedent construing
the borrowing statute and was not based on a policy of favoring local
plaintiffs. 271  The other case, Haydu v. Hospital for Joint Diseases
Orthopaedic Institute,72 discussed previously, does have an explicitly
plaintiff-oriented foCUS. 27 3 Haydu rests on a questionable analysis of
New York policy and has been criticized in subsequent cases.2 74
This leaves unprovided-for cases to consider. I have identified a
total of fourteen cases where each party would benefit from the applica-
tion of the law of his or her opponent's home state. In these cases, the
law of the place of treatment imposes a higher standard of recovery than
the law of the plaintiff's home state does. The dominant approach in
these cases is again to apply the law of the place of treatment. In six of
the fourteen cases, the court applied the law of the place of treatment to
serve the deterrent interests of the state in which the treatment
occurred.27 5 This technique, common under interest analysis, converts a
it was "absurd and unjust"); Rieger 851 F. Supp. at 791 (refusing to apply the law of the place of
treatment as contrary to the public policy of the forum); Ziesmann, 522 F. Supp. at 731 (using
forum law in light of the earlier cases in that forum indicating a "preference for the application of
Kentucky law to cases pending in Kentucky courts"); Holzsager 482 F. Supp. at 635 (applying
forum law as against the place of the treatment, which had a charitable immunity rule, on the
ground that the latter rule was "absurd and unjust").
268. See Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 444; Ziesmann 522 F. Supp. at 731.
269. 916 F.2d at 443.
270. Id. at 448.
271. Id.
272. 557 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
273. See supra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
275. See Workman v. Chinchinian, 807 F. Supp. 634, 640 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Estate of
Sullivan v. United States 777 F. Supp. 695, 702 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Lamphier v. Wash. Hosp. 524
A. 2d 729, 731 (D.C. 1987); Jenkins v. Cowen, Civ.A.No. 86-1988, 1987 WL 14601, at 2 (D.D.C.
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difficult unprovided-for case into a soluble false conflict.276 Another
three cases applied the law of the place of treatment without relying on
the deterrent interests of the forum.277 Two more cases followed the
deterrence rationale, but applied plaintiff-favoring law from a jurisdic-
tion other than the place of treatment.278 The remaining three cases
apply the law of the plaintiffs home state,27 9 although in one of these
cases the plaintiffs home state was also the state of the treatment.28 °
Another group of cases applies the law of the place of the injury,
which usually is also the place of treatment. In all, there are six cases
using the place of the injury rule.28' In five of these six cases, the place
of injury was also the place of treatment.2 82 Thus, cases applying the
law of the place of injury add weight to a general rule favoring the law
of the place of treatment.
Finally, there is a group of cases for which it is difficult to account
because it was unclear from the opinion what difference, if any, existed
between the law of the two states involved. Without this information, it
is impossible to classify the cases as true conflicts, false conflicts, or
otherwise. In these cases, eight out of twelve apply the law of the place
of treatment.283 The other four apply the plaintiffs law.28 4
July 17, 1987); Doyle v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Daily v. Somberg,
146 A. 2d 676, 681-82 (N.J. 1958).
276. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
277. See Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1990); Prince v. Trus. of Univ. of Pa.,
282 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787, 789-98 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
278. Kaiser-Georgetown Comty. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509-10 (D.C.
1985); Hitchcock v. United States 665 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
279. See Dasha v. Adelman, 699 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); D.L.C. v. Walsh, 908
S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Harper v. Silva, 399 N.W.2d 826 (Neb. 1987).
280. See Dasha, 699 N.E.2d at 26.
281. See Ham v. Hosp. of Morristown, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); Donnelly v.
McLellan, 889 F. Supp. 136 (D. Vt. 1995); Salazar v. United States 1989 WL 117711 (D. Kan.
Civ. A.No. 86-4358-9, 1989); Purnell v. United States Civ. A.No. 86-4475, 1987 WL 11211 (E.D.
Pa. May 21, 1987); Knoblett v. Kinman, 623 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Tatham v. Hoke, 469
F. Supp. 914 (W.D. N.C. 1979).
282. The lone exception, which applied the law of the state where the injury manifested itself,
is Purnell, 1987 WL 11211, at 3.
283. See Sutton v. Young, No. 94-4207, 1995 WL 643029 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995); Ewing v.
St. Louis-Clayton Orthopedic Group, Inc., 790 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1986); Washington v. United
States 769 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1985); Ham v. Hops. of Morriston, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.
Tenn. 1995); Lasley v. Georgetown Univ. 842 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1994); Knight v. Dep't of
Army, 757 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Tex. 1991); Wojiski v. Gordon, Civ.A.No. 89-8785, 1990 WL
39153 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1990); Bankston v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps. & Clinics, 639 F. Supp.
1151 (N.D. I11. 1986).
284. See Ewing v. St. Louis-Clayton Orthopedic Group, Inc., 790 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1986);
Safer v. Estate of Pack, 715 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Mayer v. United States
1989 WL 152671 (N.D. Il1. Dec. 4, 1989); Dower v. Davis, Civ. A.No. 86-2658-06, 1987 WL
12847 (D.D.C. July 28, 1987). Also included as miscellaneous cases are Fitsock v. Kaiser Found.
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As the table below illustrates, caselaw support for applying the law
of the plaintiff's domicile over the law of the place of treatment is weak.
Regardless of whether each party is benefited by his or her own state
law or is benefited by the other party's state law, more cases apply the
law of the place of treatment than the law of the plaintiff's domicile.
Moreover, most of those cases applying the law of the plaintiff's domi-
cile involve additional defendant contacts with that state. Additionally,
the place of injury rule in effect applies the law of the place of treatment
in most cases. Generalizing, one may say that in interstate medical mal-
practice cases, the law applied is that of the place of treatment, unless




True Conflict 13 14
Unprovided-for-cases 9 3
Place of Injury 5 1
Unclassified 8 4
Total 35 22
(8) Plaintiff's domicile had other connections
with Defendant; FTCA cases
(4) Plaintiff's domicile law applied because it
was the forum
Revised Total 36 11
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM IN TELEMEDICINE
The preceding discussion of cases lays a foundation for assessing
how courts will choose the applicable law in telemedicine cases. While
there are some critical factual differences between existing cases and
telemedicine cases, much of what the courts have done to date solves
telemedicine choice of law cases in a satisfactory manner.
The domiciliary approach to choice of law likely will do little to
resolve interstate telemedicine problems because telemedicine cases are
almost certain to fall into the category of cases that are hardest for a
domiciliary approach to resolve. As discussed above, the easiest cases
for a domiciliary-based approach to digest are those in which the parties
are from the same state and the conduct or event occurred in a second
state. 85 The personal approach holds that only the state of common
Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-0490, 1990 WL 129445 (D.D.C. Feb.
6, 1990); Merkle v. Robinson, 737 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1999) and Packer v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1989). In these cases, the place of
treatment was the same as the plaintiffs domicile.
285. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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domicile has any legitimate claim to govern, and thus such cases are
really just "false" conflicts. But cases of common domicile are unlikely
to arise in the context of telemedicine. The paradigm case in
telemedicine is a physician from one state treating a patient from
another. While telemedicine holds great promise for in-state provision
of medical services-transmitting services from major urban hospitals
to under-served rural areas within the same state-such intrastate cases
do not create choice of law problems. Thus, choice of law problems in
telemedicine uniformly will involve a patient and a physician from dif-
ferent states. The personal, or domiciliary, approach to choice of law
has difficulty handling precisely these cases.286 In a situation where the
physician is from a state with a screening statute and the patient is from
a state with no such scheme, interest analysis would declare a true con-
flict. The defendant's state wishes to protect its resident physician from
unfounded claims; the plaintiff's state wishes to protect its resident's
immediate access to court. The domiciliary approach to choice of law
provides no solution in this situation. If each state simply applies its
own law when it is the forum, jurisdiction will govern the result.
The other category of split domicile cases are those in which each
party is benefited by their opponent's state's law. These unprovided-for
cases are likewise difficult for a domiciliary-based approach to solve
because neither state advances its policy by applying its law. Resolution
of these cases requires finding an interest that is not based on benefiting
a local citizen. Courts usually find an interest in burdening and regulat-
ing a local to ensure safe conduct.
287
Because a personal approach to choice of law fails in telemedicine
cases, courts then inevitably will be drawn to territorial solutions. As
the preceding survey shows, courts addressing choice of law in tradi-
tional medical malpractice practice cases have generally reverted to the
place of the treatment. In true conflicts cases, this approach upholds
concerns of fairness and protecting expectations. In unprovided-for
cases (i.e., those where the physician is held to a higher standard of
liability under his or her own state's law), the rule continues to protect
expectations and allows a court to find and fulfill an interest in regulat-
ing conduct.
Telemedicine cases typically will arise in a different context than
traditional malpractice choice of law cases. In the vast majority of tradi-
tional malpractice cases the place of injury was also the place of treat-
ment. Cases departing from this pattern usually involved a
misdiagnosis. In contrast, in the telemedicine context, negligence and
286. See id.
287. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
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injury generally will be spread across two states; after all, physical dis-
tance between the physician and the patient is the presupposition of
telemedicine. In the past, courts more often have applied the law of the
place of treatment than that of the place of injury when the two are
different.288
However, the place of injury rule may be a more attractive alterna-
tive in telemedicine cases because in those cases the place of treatment
rule loses some of its allure. As noted above, one argument in favor of
the place of treatment rule is that it promotes fairness. A patient who
comes into a physician's state should expect to be subject to any less
favorable law of that state; a physician acting within his or her own state
should be able to count on the protections of that state's laws. 289 How-
ever, in telemedicine cases this fairness argument supporting the place
of treatment rule is not as strong. The plaintiff has not gone into the
physician's home state. Conversely, the physician could be character-
ized as projecting himself into the plaintiff's state by digitally treating a
person physically there. As the rationale for using the place of treatment
rule in telemedicine cases weakens, its competitor, the place of injury
rule, may appear more appealing.
I would hope, however, that courts in telemedicine cases do not
jettison the place of treatment rule. The characterization suggested in
the preceding paragraph-that the defendant-physician is injecting him-
self into the plaintiffs state-begs the question. The physician is cer-
tainly virtually in the patient's state, but similarly the patient is virtually
in the physician's state. In truth, both are at home in the body and
abroad in their digital spirits. Although a mechanical application of the
place of treatment rule becomes impossible in telemedicine, we may
retain the polices it promotes by adjusting it to a new context.
We apply the place of treatment rule for two reasons: it is fair and
it is more sensible than the place of injury rule. As for the latter reason,
the place of injury rule remains subject to criticism as merely double-
counting the plaintiffs domicile.290 Indeed, this criticism is even more
true in telemedicine cases than in traditional ones because the patient
predictably will be injured in his home state. The place of treatment rule
also continues to serve the goal of allowing the state in which the physi-
cian practices to set standards for him.
Moreover, there is a consistency argument: because the cases are
relatively stable in applying the law of the place of treatment in non-
telemedicine cases, we should not create a rule that treats telemedicine
288. See supra notes 98-101, 122 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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providers differently and more harshly than their colleagues practicing
face-to-face medicine. Such a distinction would create a disincentive to
practicing telemedicine that is contrary to sound health care policy.
Additionally, courts should take into account a policy of furthering inter-
state access to medical care.291 A choice of law rule that burdens a
telemedicine provider with higher standards of liability when treating
patients from certain states will simply discourage the provider from
providing care for patients from those states.
Finally, applying the law of the patient's state would lead to a free-
loading problem. Lower standards of liability are often enacted to lower
the total cost of the activity in question. In the context of medical mal-
practice, the goal of many states with lower standards of liability is to
reduce the cost of medical care for in-state consumers of those services.
Allowing an out-of-state patient to impose higher liability on a physician
not only to subverts the state's attempt to create a lower liability regime,
but also bestows a benefit on the patient without the associated cost of
that benefit. In effect, the recovery by the out-of-state patient at a higher
level of liability is subsidized by the in-state patients of the physician.
Refinement of the place of treatment rule to reflect the different
dynamics of telemedicine may also sustain fairness arguments. The
place of treatment rule protect the stay-at-home party. In telemedicine
cases, though, both parties have stayed at home. Or have they? If both
truly had remained local, they never would have entered into a patient-
physician relationship. Clearly, one or the other did something to estab-
lish the relationship. To properly apply the place of treatment rule to
telemedicine, one must examine the origins of the patient-physician rela-
tionship. Did the telemedical provider aggressively thrust himself into
the plaintiffs state, seeking out-of-state transactions, or was the defen-
dant passive, waiting for patients in other states, probably upon a referral
from their local physician, to "come to" him for treatment? By analogy,
most of the cases departing from the place of treatment rule in the
existing body of caselaw do so where the defendant had additional con-
tacts in the plaintiffs state.292 Thus, the place of treatment rule can
continue to be used with the caveat that a physician's solicitation of the
patient from another state may subject him to that state's laws.
The devil, of course, is in the details. If a telemedicine provider,
who is a specialist in a rare and serious medical condition, informs pro-
fessional colleagues in another state of his availability for telemedical
consults, would such conduct amount to solicitation? What if this physi-
cian has performed consultations on ten patients from that state in prior
291. See Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (William, J., concurring).
292. See supra notes 254-265 and accompanying text.
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years? On twenty patients? Or will courts only find solicitation where
more aggressive self-promotion is directed at patients themselves?
Again, the existing caselaw offers analogies in which medical providers
have been subjected to the law of the patient's state because of the
defendant's contacts there.293
To some extent, the choice of law regime applied to telemedicine
will depend upon what emerges as the dominant business model for
telemedicine. Internet physicians offering on-line prescriptions for
Viagra offer no services that are not locally available. Additionally,
these telemedicine providers directly target patients. For this type of
telemedecine provider, the law of the patient's state is likely to be
applied. On the other end of the spectrum is a less aggressive and more
traditional model. The telemedicine treatment is originated by the
patient's face-to-face medical provider, who seeks a telemedicine con-
sultation with an out-of-state specialist. The telemedicine provider
offers services which are not locally available and his patients are
directed to him by another health professional, who can be trusted to
provide some level of protection for the local patient. In this model, the
law of the place of treatment is more likely to be applied.
This disparity of outcomes would not be all bad. Lurking behind
choice of law issues in telemedicine is a foundational question of
whether we wish to encourage or discourage it. The probable answer to
that question is that we wish to encourage good telemedicine (consulta-
tions via technology with experts normally not available to the patient)
and discourage bad telemedicine (on-line Viagra prescriptions). The
choice of law approach I have outlined would dovetail into these sub-
stantive polices: the freebooters more likely would be subject to the law
of the patient's state and the learned experts would be protected by their
own state's laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Caselaw demonstrates that the law applied in interstate medical
malpractice cases is and generally should be the law of the place the
treatment, unless the physician has initiated the relationship by seeking
the patient out in the patient's home state. This rule allows the state of
treatment to either protect or regulate physicians who act locally and
293. See Scharfman by Scharfman v. Nat'l Jewish Hosp. & Research Ctr. 506 N.Y.S.2d 90
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (applying the law of the plaintiff's residence where defendant hospital
conducted activity from a New York office which screens potential patients); Wall v. Noble, 705
S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App. 1986) (applying law of plaintiffs residence where doctor had a satellite
office in that state and the decision as to the need for surgery was made there). But see Blakesley
v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that the law of the place of treatment applied
despite physician initially consulting patient in the patient's home state).
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also protects parties expectations. In the future, as telemedicine
becomes more common, the same rule should continue to be applied.
This approach will encourage use of telemedicine while protecting of
patients from potentially harmful aspects of it.
